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ABSTRACT 
The rapid growth in the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has led to concern about 
the weakening of the multilateral trading system. This thesis examines the spread of such 
agreement and the extent to which they pose a threat to the multilateral system. Regionalism and 
multilateralism are complimentary as shown in the case study of the East African Community. 
The current regional trade agreement management rules are weak and ambiguous and possible 
amendments for these rules are proposed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1.0. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND. 
The growth of regional trading Blocks-often known as regional integration agreements (RIAs) or 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) is one of the major international relations developments of 
recent years and a much debated concept in World Trade Organization (WTO) circles.1 These 
agreements have become so widespread that most WTO members are now also parties to one or 
more of them, and their scope, coverage and number are still growing.2 The General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) — and now the WTO, from its inception— has allowed member 
countries to conclude customs unions and free-trade areas, as an exception to the fundamental 
principle of non discrimination set out in the Most-favoured-nation clause of GATT’s Article 1.3 
It is estimated that more than half of world trade is now conducted under RTAs.4  They are found 
in every continent.5 This evolution in the trade regime poses a number of questions. Among 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, the bulk of the literature reviewed in the following papers: Bhagwati J‘Regionalism versus 
Multilateralism’ (1992) 15 The World Economy 5 540; Giorgia Albertin, Regionalism or Multilateralism? A 
Political Economy Choice, IMF Working Paper WP/08/65, International Monetary Fund (March 2008 );L.Alan, 
Winters , Regionalism versus Multilateralism, Policy Research Working Paper 1687,The World Bank International 
Economic Department, International Trade Division (Nov 1996);and Bhagwati, J ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: 
An Overview’ in  Jaime, D , and Panagariya(eds) A New Dimensions in Regional Integration (1993) 22-57. 
2
 Among the best known are the European Union, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the Common Market of Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East African Community (EAC). 
3
 See ‘Hong Kong WTO Ministerial 2005: Briefing Notes.Rules: Regional Agreements Building Blocks or 
Stumbling Blocks?’ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min05-e/brief-e/brief09-e.htm. 
(accessed 6 September 2010). 
4
 See ‘Hong Kong WTO Ministerial 2005: Briefing Notes. Rules: Regional Agreements Building Blocks or 
Stumbling Blocks? ’  
5
 The surge in RTAs has continued unabated since the early 1990s. As of 31 July 2010, some 474 RTAs worldwide 
counting goods and services notifications separately, have been notified to the GATT/WTO. Of these, 351 RTAs 
were notified under Article XXIV of the GATT 1947 or GATT 1994; 31 under the Enabling Clause; and 92 under 
Article V of the GATS. At that same date, 283 agreements were in force. The overall number of RTAs in force has 
been increasing steadily, a trend likely to be strengthened by the many RTAs currently under negotiation. Of these 
RTAs, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and partial scope agreements account for 90%, while customs unions account 
for 10% available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min05-e/brief-e/brief09-e.htm. (accessed 6 
September 2010). 
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these is the overriding issue of the implication of regionalism for the world trading system and its 
goals of multilateralism? What has been the impact of such regional agreements? What are the 
legal constraints and discipline of the WTO system in order to avoid erosion of the Most-
Favoured Nation (MFN) Status of member states? And lastly, how are WTO member states 
supposed to honour their rights and obligations attached to these combinations (regionalism and 
multilaterism) which are not always easy to distinguish since some people argue that they are 
based on healthy complementarity while others see them as conflictual.6 
Regional integration agreements can be studied from different angles. In this thesis, the focus is 
on the EAC region and the purpose is to undertake a brief overview of the different types of 
RTAs in order to assess the relationship between regional and multilateral liberalization and to 
consider the future of regionalism. Central to the thesis is the view that regional and multilateral 
liberalization has generally been a positive story. The focus of the thesis is on trade. Although it 
is true that the challenges facing the multilateral and regional trading system goes well beyond 
the traditional definition of trade which the thesis does not discuss. This thesis argues that 
changes to effectuate a more concrete and viable management of RTAs in the multilaterised 
system is necessary. It then examines and reviews proposals in the WTO aimed at modifying 
Article XXIV of GATT and possibly Article V of GATS.7 
1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT. 
As the number of regional agreements increases, so does the need to analyze whether the WTO’s 
rules on these agreements need to be clarified further. WTO members differ on whether regional 
agreements help or hinder the multilateral trading system — whether they function as “building 
                                                          
6
 A divergence in the views of trade economists exists. Whereas Fred Bergsten and Lawrence Summers are strong 
supporters of bilateralism/regionalism, others including Bhagwati, Panagariya are sceptical about RTAs (see 
Bhagwati J Termites in the Trading system: How preferential Agreements undermine Free Trade (2008) 50. 
7
 See Compendium of Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements, Negotiating Groups on Rules, World Trade 
Organization, August 1, 2002, TN/RL/W/8/Rev. 1(02-4246) which offers a short summary of an extensive debate 
held mainly in the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements.  A more comprehensive, though somewhat outdated, 
account can be found in the document WT/REG/W/37, entitled Synopsis of "Systemic" Issues Related to Regional 
Trade Agreements, of 2 March 2000.  
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blocs” or “stumbling blocs”.8 One view is that the regional agreements strengthen the 
multilateral system because they can move faster, and because they can help integrate developing 
countries into the world economy.9 Other countries believe that the WTO’s rules should be 
revised— and not just reinterpreted — so that the two systems can work together better, 
particularly since the number of agreements has increased, and their membership has 
increasingly overlapped.10 At the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, for example, 
WTO members agreed to give a political push to this question and to negotiate a solution, giving 
due regard to the role that these agreements can play in fostering development.11 The issues 
raised by the regionalism debate are complex. Some are primarily legal. For example, GATT 
Article XXIV requires that a regional trade agreement should cover “substantially all the 
trade” in goods between its members. Similarly, GATS Article V calls for a “substantial 
sectoral coverage” in services. But there is no agreement among members on what this means. 
In Turkey –Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (hereinafter Turkey – 
Textiles) case,12 the Panel expressed the view that “the ordinary meaning of the term 
“substantially” in the context of sub-paragraph 8(a) appears to provide for both qualitative and 
quantitative components”. The Appellate Body confirmed this view stating that the test in Article 
                                                          
8
 See ‘Hong Kong WTO Ministerial 2005: Briefing Notes. Rules: Regional Agreements Building Blocks or 
Stumbling Blocks? ’ The relationship between regionalism and multilateralism has become a critical systemic issue, 
reflected in the WTO Regional Trade Agreements Committee’s increasing backlog of unconcluded reports and its 
lack of consensus on the broader question of the consistency between regional agreements and WTO rules. 
9
 See WTO News 1995 press Releases Press/10 18 April 1995.It is noted that no evidence of polarization of world 
Trade among the “blocs “and no clash between world and regional trade system. Thus “the regional and multilateral 
integration initiatives are compliments rather than alternatives in the pursuit of open trade available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min05-e/brief-e/brief09-e.htm (accessed 6 September 2010). 
10
 These are among the main conclusions of a study, Regionalism and the World Trading system, published by the 
WTO Secretariat, in Geneva.However,commenting on the WTO rules and procedures governing regional 
integrations, the study says:  
‘[I]t may be that governments will consider that reforms are necessary in order to put the mutually supportive 
relationship between multilaterism and regionalism on a more solid foundation.’ 
11
 The ministerial declaration mandates negotiations aimed at ‘clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures 
under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements. The negotiations shall take into account 
the developmental aspects of regional trade agreements.’  
12
 Appellate Body Report, adopted on 19 November 1999 (WT/DS34/AB/R). 
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XXIV.8 required a certain percentage of trade to be liberalized and also the non-exclusion of any 
major sector of economic activity. This test offered some flexibility.  The word “substantial” did 
not mean “all”, but it required “something considerably more than merely some of the trade.” In 
practice however, many agreements leave out large and sensitive areas such as agriculture and 
financial services.13 This poses difficulties for assessing whether the agreements are consistent 
with WTO rules.14 Other issues are more institutional in nature. They highlight possible 
discrepancies between the regional agreements’ rules and those of the WTO. The focus in 
negotiations has shifted over time from tariff reductions to rules and regulations, both at the 
regional and at the multilateral level — for instance, rules on anti-dumping, subsidies, or product 
standards. Some recent regional agreements include provisions not covered by the WTO at all, 
such as investment or competition policies.15  
Finally and most importantly, there is the economic dimension. Today, this goes far beyond the 
effects of tariff preferences on members and non-members of regional agreements. Rather, this is 
                                                          
13
 WTO rules require that each member accord Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to other WTO members.  
However, GATT Article XXIV allows exceptions to the MFN principle for RTAs so long as they meet certain 
conditions.  First, the agreement must lower trade barriers within the regional group.  Second, the agreement cannot 
raise trade barriers against non-participating members.  Third, the agreement is supposed to cover substantially all 
trade among the RTA partners.  In reality, RTA participants seldom meet all these conditions.  Moreover, the trade 
coverage of many RTAs is incomplete with many "sensitive" sectors exempted from trade liberalization.  That 
situation is especially true with respect to agriculture.   
14
 On the other hand, while the status of a WTO Member remains unchanged by the mere fact that it becomes party 
to an FTA, the legal standing of WTO Members which become parties to a customs union seems less clear.  The 
question is whether in the latter case WTO obligations continue to subsist and operate at the level of the original 
customs territories.  It has been argued that a new legal entity is created when customs territories form a customs 
union, on the ground that a new commercial policy vis-à-vis third countries is then to be established.  
15
 According to the UNCTAD (2005), of the 300-odd bilateral and regional trade agreements in force or in 
negotiation, over 100 contain provisions related to competition policy. The main reason is to ensure that efforts to 
liberalize trade by eliminating border barriers are not undercut by restrictive practices behind the border. A number 
of actual or proposed bilateral and regional agreements, such as NAFTA and the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
already contain sections on competition policy. The aim of those pushing for competition policy to be included in 
free trade agreements is to curtail the discretion and flexibility of host governments in regulating the entry and 
operations of foreign firms, and to prevent any favourable treatment being given to domestic firms. Meanwhile, the 
EU has also been criticized for insisting on the inclusion of competition policy in its Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Malaysia’s competition policy has also been a 
significant point of friction in FTA talks with Washington. (See UNCTAD publication entitled "Competition 
Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to Assure Development Gains", which was launched at the Fifth UN 
Conference held in Antalya, Turkey in November 2005). 
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now a question of the regional agreements’ impact on the shape and development of world trade 
itself — given their large and increasing number and their overlapping membership. Over the 
next few years, this will be one of the most important challenges facing trade policymakers in all 
continents and therefore changes to effectuate a more concrete, viable management of RTAs in 
the multilaterised system are necessary. 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS. 
Divergences in the views of both trade economists and lawyers  on whether  regional agreements 
help or hinder the multilateral trading system — whether they function as “building blocs” or 
“stumbling blocs” pinpoints to the long struggle  between the proponents of the two schools of 
thought. It is hypothesized that regionalism and multilaterism are complimentary. The present 
study will be concerned with the following research questions: 
i) Does regionalism and multilaterism have a conflictual or complimentary relationship? 
ii) Is the revision of WTO rules (but not just reinterpretation) taking into account political, 
legal, institutional and economic factors necessary for : 
a) A more concrete and viable management of RTAs in the multilateral system? 
b) Enabling the two systems (regionalism and multilaterism) to work together better? 
1.3. AIMS OR OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH. 
As stated above, like it or not, RTAs are here to stay and  have therefore become so widespread 
that most WTO members are now also parties to one or more of them, and their scope, coverage 
and number are still growing. Further, issues raised by the regionalism debate are very complex 
ranging from legal, institutional and finally economic. The aims of the study are: 
a) To show that only changes in the WTO legal management of RTAs, taking into account 
institutional, political and economic factors of regionalism and standard interpretation of 
the legal provisions thereof will actually ensure a complimentary relationship between 
regionalism and multilateral objective in world trade law and policy.  
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b) To explore the deficiencies in the WTO’s legal framework for managing RTAs, focusing 
exclusively on the shortcomings of Article XXIV of the GATT, and Article V of the 
GATS which are the most controversial and ineffectual. 
c) To discuss the futile process by which countries notify RTAs to the WTO, and examine 
what is being done to address this problem, reviewing proposals in the WTO aimed at 
modifying Article XXIV GATT and possibly Article V of GATS and; 
d) Finally to outline how the WTO member states could honour their rights and obligations 
attached to regionalism and multilaterism in a beneficial way using the East Africa 
Community as a case study. 
1.4. SCOPE OF THE STUDY. 
RTAs have become so widespread that most WTO members are now also parties to one or more 
of them, and their scope, coverage and number are still growing. Currently there are 474 RTAs 
worldwide. Among the best known are the European Union, the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Southern 
Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), and the East African Community (EAC).The study of all these needs  more time 
and resources and in order to achieve the objectives of the study stated above, this study will 
focus on the East African Community (EAC). 
1.5. METHODOLOGY OF STUDY. 
The literature on regionalism versus multilateralism is growing as economists and political 
scientists grapple with the question of whether regional integration arrangements are good or bad 
for the multilateral system. Are regional integration arrangements “building blocks, or stumbling 
blocks,” in Jagdish Bhagwati’s phrase, 16 or stepping stones toward multilateralism? As 
                                                          
16
 See Bhagwati, J ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview’ in Jaime, D, and Panagariya (eds) A New 
Dimensions in Regional Integration. 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
economists worry about the ability of the World Trade Organization to maintain the GATT’s 
unsteady yet distinct momentum towards liberalism, and as they contemplate the emergence of 
more regional agreements, the question has never been more pressing. A comparative analysis of 
the literature and the case study of the EAC will be conducted to evaluate the relationship 
between regional and multilateral trade liberalization. 
1.6. THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL AGREEMENTS ON THE GLOBAL TRADING 
SYSTEM. 
1.6.1. Introduction. 
The growing importance acquired by Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) in the framework of 
international trading system over the last few decades has provoked an intense debate and 
questions regarding the capacity of the WTO, the central pillar of the multilateral trade system, 
to face the increasing number of RTAs in the world.17 These new developments in RTA 
formation have led to a renewed interest in RTAs, with many academics questioning the impact 
RTAs have had on members and third countries.18  
1.6.2. WTO and Regionalism. 
Almost a decade ago, the then Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Mike 
Moore was concerned about the future of the World trade system when regional agreements were 
gaining popularity. His concerns were actually captured in his speech when he asked: 
“Is there a risk that regionalism is becoming a stumbling –block, more than a building 
block, for the new WTO, draining energy from multilateral negotiations, fragmenting 
                                                          
17
 See Roberta Benini and Micheal, G. Plumner ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: Crucial issues in the debate on 
RTAs.’ From the Issue entitled:  The Political Economy of Regional Economic Integration: the Challenges for 
Emerging Economies. [Electronic Version]. Economic change and Restructuring 41 November 4,267-287 available 
at http://www.Sringerlink.com/content/h271416318446277/ (accessed 6 October 2010). 
18
 See Bhagwati, J ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview’ in Jaime, D, and Panagariya (eds) A New 
Dimensions in Regional Integration. 
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internal trade, and creating a new international dis-order characterized by growing 
rivalries and marginalization and the possibility of hostile blocks?”19 
His predecessor Renato Ruggiero had, in fact voiced a similar concern in 1996, when he wrote: 
“Ensuring that regionalism and multilateralism grow together-and not apart-is perhaps the most 
urgent issue facing trade policy-makers today”20  
These words spoken in 1996 could still be relevant today with the proliferation of RTAs among 
developing countries which have expanded, increased and in general gained a new momentum. 
Mike Moore and Renato Ruggiero were not questioning the importance or the value of RTAs; 
they were just concerned that the proliferation of regional trade agreements spurred by 
globalization may endanger the future of the world trade system that has been in place for 
decades. 
The WTO Report, The Future of the WTO, has also criticized this proliferation of bilateral and 
regional trade agreements on the grounds that this has made the most-favoured nation 21 principle 
the exception rather than the rule, and has led to increased discrimination in the world trade. 
However, negotiations of such agreements have continued to progress.22 The question that then 
                                                          
19
 ‘Globalizing Regionalism: A New Role for Mercosur in the Multilateral Trading System’ A Speech by Mike 
Moore, Director General, World Trade Organization, Buenos Aires, November 28, 2000 in Donald A. Calvert  How 
the Multilateral Trade System Under the World Trade Organization is Attempting to Reconcile the Contradiction & 
Hurdles posed by Regional Trade Agreements, An Analysis of  the Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
& Trade. (Unpublished Master’s Thesis, International Commerce & Policy Program School of Public policy George 
Mason University, Virginia, 2002). 
20
 ‘Multilateralism and Regionalism in Trade’ by Renatto Roggiero, Director-General, World Trade Organization, 
US. Agency, Economic Perspectives, WTO View, November 1996:1. 
21
 Hereinafter abbreviated as MFN. 
 
22
 Minter Ellison ‘The Future of the WTO: Report by the Consultative Board to the WTO Director General’ 
Published March 31, 2005 – Australia available at http://www.hg.org/articles/article_677.html  (accessed 6 October 
2010).The report identifies the following as being the key challenges faced by the WTO: the wide 
misrepresentations in civil society discussions of the process of globalisation and the role of the WTO ,the threat to 
the non-discrimination corner stone of the WTO posed by the spread of preferential trade agreements 
(FTAs),decision-making within the WTO and further reform of the WTO’s dispute settlement system. The report is 
also highly concerned with the recent proliferation of preferential trade agreements (or more colloquially FTAs) and 
their impact on the most-favoured-nation (MFN) and national treatment principles of the WTO. It argues that the 
economic case for FTAs is suspect and that by promoting preferential market access between limited numbers of 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
follows is whether multilateralism and regionalism have a complementary or conflicting 
relationship. This depends on the understanding of the two terms.  Borrowing from Allan 
Winter’s definition, regionalism is any policy designed to reduce trade barriers between a subset 
of countries regardless of whether those countries are actually contiguous or even close to each 
other.23 Lucian Cernat on the other hand defines regionalism as both an increase in intra-regional 
trade flows and in the number of RTAs.24 
Although it has no single definition, “multilateralism” in this context refers to trade conducted 
without discrimination throughout the world trade system.25 Cae-One Kim, Former President, 
EUSA Asia-Pacific opines that regionalism has in fact overshadowed multilateralism and the 
distinction between the two is no longer meaningful.26 According to Kim what is more pragmatic 
is to realize the goal of multilaterism by way of regionalism. Having simply defined the two 
terms, multilateralism and regionalism above, the question that still stands is whether RTAs by 
their nature are stumbling or building blocks? 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
countries they are invariably trade diverting. Moreover, the report warns that the "spaghetti bowl" of discriminatory 
preferences under FTAs makes the world trading system confusing for traders and has the potential to substantially 
increase transaction costs. The report recommends that FTAs be subject to more rigorous review and effective 
disciplines in the WTO and that the focus of governments should be re-directed to effectively reducing MFN tariffs 
and non-tariff measures in multilateral trade negotiations. 
23
 Allan L.Winter Multilateralism versus Regionalism. Policy Research Working Paper No.1687, The World 
 Bank  International Economics Department, International Trade Division   available at  
http://ww-wds-worldbank0rg/server/WDSContentserver/WDSP/1B/1996/11/01/0000009265- 3970.  
(accessed 6 October 2010).  
. 
24
 Lucian, C ‘Eager to ink, but ready to act? RTA proliferation and international cooperation on competition policy’ 
in Philippe, B.et al. (eds).Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to Assure Development 
Gains.  (2005)1-36. 
25
 See World Trade Organization, Trading into the Future, 2 ed (2001) available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-
e/doload-e/tif.pdf. (accessed 6 October 2010). The principle of non-discrimination is one of the main reasons 
countries join the WTO.It provides for a “level-playing field” for all members to trade goods and services with one 
another. 
26
 Multilateralism and Regionalism in a Globalizing World: A Perspective from Asia-Pacific Region. Keynote 
Speech by  Cae-One Kim, Former President,EUSA Asia-Pacific, Visiting Professor, Graduate School of 
International Studies, Seoul National University, October 8,2005:4 available at http://wwwsoc.nii.ac.jp/eusa-
japan/download/eusa_ap/keynote_Cae-OneKim.pdf.(accessed 6 October 2010).  
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1.6.3. RTAs a stumbling or building block? 
Whether regional agreements are building blocks or stumbling blocks to open global markets—
the terms Jagdish Bhagwati used—remain a central question.27 On the other hand are they 
stepping stones, in Baldwin phrase, 28 towards multilaterism? Are RTAs, supportive of the 
multilateral trading system (MTS) or do they undermine its effectiveness? A divergence in the 
views of trade economists exists. Whereas Fred Bergsten and Lawrence Summers are strong 
supporters of bilateralism/regionalism, others including Bhagwati, Panagariya are sceptical about 
RTAs.29 
Bhagwati,30 in particular, has raised the question as to whether RTAs pose a threat to the 
multilateral trading system, and he has initiated a rapid growth in the economic literature on the 
subject.31 As pointed out in the methodology section of this research above, the literature on 
regionalism versus multilaterism is growing as economist and political scientists grapple with the 
question of whether regional integration arrangements are good or bad for the multilateral 
system. As economists worry about the ability of the World Trade Organization to maintain the 
expanded, increased and new momentum RTAs in the world, and as they contemplate the 
emergence of the world-scale regional integration arrangements (the EU, NAFTA, EFTA, 
MERCOSUR, ASEAN, and possibly EAC), the question has never been more pressing.32 
                                                          
27
 See Bhagwati, J ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview’ in Jaime, D, and Panagariya (eds) A New 
Dimensions in Regional Integration. 
28
 Baldwin, R.E. Stepping Stones or building blocs? Regional and multilateral integration .Paper prepared for the G-
20 Workshop on “Regional economic integration in a global framework”, Sept 22-23 2004 organised by the 
European Central Bank and the People’s Bank of China in Beijing. 
29See Bhagwati J Termites in the Trading system: How preferential Agreements undermine Free Trade (2008) 50. 
30
 See Bhagwati, J ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview’ in Jaime, D, and Panagariya (eds) A New 
Dimensions in Regional Integration. 
31
 Jo-Ann Crawford & Sam Laird. Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO.  Paper prepared for a meeting of the 
North American Economic and Finance Association in Boston, 6-9 January 2000. 
32
 See Regional Trade Agreement gateway available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min05-e/brief-
e/brief09-e.htm. (accessed 6 September 2010). 
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 Bhagwati views regionalism as weakening the supremacy of the multilateral system as the best 
solution for ensuring fair competition and equal opportunities for weak countries.33 
Winter on the other hand views regionalism as a means to bring trade partners to the multilateral 
negotiating table because it is essentially coercive.34 
Tiziana Bonapace argues that regionalism has come to offer governments of both developed and 
developing countries alike an attractive strategy to resolve issues that would be more difficult to 
resolve in wider multilateral context.35She further points out that all major trading countries 
belong to one, or more typically, two or three,RTAs or regional integration arrangements of 
some kind.Therefore,it would appear that trade on a most-favoured-nation basis is more likely to 
be the exception than the norm.36 
Bhagwati37 and Krueger 38 express strong concerns about negative effects of growing 
regionalism and they worry that the RTAs divert attention from the multilateral trading system. 
Bhagwati stresses the benefits of free trade and rejects arguments about the need for an 
alternative to the multilateral trading system (MTS) for countries which wish to liberalize faster, 
regionalism as a supplement to MTS, regionalism to accelerate the MTS processes, and so on. 
Cae-One Kim further opines that what is more pragmatic is to realize the goal of multilaterism 
                                                          
33
 See Bhagwati J‘Regionalism versus Multilateralism’ (1992) 15 The World Economy 5 540. 
34
 Alan L.Winters, Regionalism versus Multilateralism. Policy Research  Paper prepared for a conference on 
regional integration sponsored by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, Working Paper 1687, The World Bank 
International Economic Department, International Trade Division, La Coruna,Spain,  Nov 26-27 (1996). 
35
 Tiziana, B.Multilateralism and Regionalism: Enhancing Integration of Developing Countries into the Multilateral 
Trading system through Regionalism.  A paper prepared by Ms Tiziana Bonapace, Economic Affairs officer, Trade 
Policy Section, International Trade and industry Division, ESCAP (undated).available at 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/chap1-2161.pdf (accessed 6 October 2010). 
36
 Tiziana, B.Multilateralism and Regionalism: Enhancing Integration of Developing Countries into the Multilateral 
Trading system through Regionalism. 
37
 See Bhagwati J‘Regionalism versus Multilateralism’ (1992) 15 The World Economy 5 540. 
38
 Krueger, A. Free Trade Agreements versus Customs Unions, NBER, Working Paper No.50849 (1995). 
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by way of regionalism and the distinction between the two is unnecessary at this juncture.39On 
the other hand, Baldwin, concludes in his paper that regionalism, will foster multilateral 
liberalisation. He regards regionalism much more as a complement to multilaterism (building 
blocks rather than stumbling blocks).40 
Roberta Benini and Micheal G. Plummer in their paper,41 supports Mashayeki and Ito comments 
that: 
“It is an urgent task in the policy agenda to find possible solutions, ensure compatibility 
and coherence, and limit the phenomena of treaty congestion-overlapping and 
contradictions across agreements-that might put the multilateral trade system at risk.”42 
Mikoi Kuwayana, Jose’ Dora’n Lima and Vero’nica Silva points out  that the  slow progress of 
the multilateral trading system has led to a wave of Regional Trade Agreements(RTAs) 
worldwide.43 These agreements emerge as an opportunity for signatory countries, but they also 
generate concerns in relation to such aspects as their consistency with multilateral commitments 
and the broadening and deepening of free trade agreements (FTA) concessions beyond those 
assumed in WTO(i.e.,WTO-Plus disciplines).44 The WTO itself, however, has come to accept 
                                                          
39
 See Multilateralism and Regionalism in a Globalizing World: A Perspective from Asia-Pacific Region. Keynote 
Speech by Cae-One Kim. 
40
 Baldwin, R.E. Stepping Stones or building blocs? Regional and multilateral integration .Paper prepared for the G-
20 Workshop on “Regional economic integration in a global framework”, Sept 22-23 2004 organised by the 
European Central Bank and the People’s Bank of China in Beijing. 
41
 See Roberta B. and Micheal, G. Plumner ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: Crucial issues in the debate on 
RTAs.’ From the Issue entitled:  The Political Economy of Regional Economic Integration: the Challenges for 
Emerging Economies. [Electronic Version]. Economic change and Restructuring 41 November 4,267-287 available 
at http://www.Sringerlink.com/content/h271416318446277/ (accessed 6 October 2010). 
42
 Mashayeki M., & Ito, T. (ed) (2005) Multilateralism and Regionalism: the new interface .UNCTAD, New York 
and Geneva. 
43
 Mikoi K, et al. (2005).Bilateralism and Regionalism: Re-establishing the Primacy of Multilateralism a Latin 
American and Caribbean Perspective.NACIONES UNIDAS, Division of International Trade and Integration, 
Santiago, Chile. 
44
 Mikoi K, et al. (2005).Bilateralism and Regionalism: Re-establishing the Primacy of Multilateralism a Latin 
American and Caribbean Perspective. 
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that the regionalism movement has come to stay, recognises its potential positive contributions if 
devised effectively, and stresses the need to correct efficient RTAs.45 Empirical studies seem to 
suggest that RTAs have remained supportive of the multilateral trading system(MTS).A WTO 
study in 1995 concluded that there was no “clash” between regional and global trade and the two 
complemented each other. 46 The findings of the report also confirm an overall complementary 
function of both MFN and preferential trade. In other words regionalism and multilaterism are 
complimentary. Indeed, while these may be seen as competing legal approaches, in a 
combination they assist in the process of dismantling trade barriers.47 Among the main 
conclusions of a study, Regionalism and the World Trading system, published, by the WTO 
secretariat, in Geneva, commenting on the WTO rules and procedures governing regional 
integrations, the study concluded that:  
“... [I]t may be that governments will consider that reforms are necessary in order to put 
the mutually supportive relationship between multilateralism and regionalism on a more 
solid foundation.” 48 
As acknowledged further, in the WTO 2004 published Report of the Consultative Board to the 
Director General,49 nearly six decades after the founding of the GATT, the principle of non-
discrimination characterized by the Most Favored Nation clause ceased to be the rule of 
international trading system. While much trade between the major economies still takes place on 
                                                          
45
 See Pascal Lamy Director General WTO 10th September 2007 ‘Proliferation of regional trade agreements 
breeding concern in .WTO|News-speech. available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl67_e.htm 
(accessed 6 October 2010). 
46
 See WTO. (1995).Regionalism and the World Trading System (hereinafter WTO Report); for a useful summary of 
this report. 
47
 See WTO (1995).Regionalism and the World Trading System .A study by the WTO Secretariat showed that there 
had been a definite trend toward broader as well as faster market access liberalisation of non-tariff measures in 
RTAs, in parallel to developments in the MTS (Inventory of Non-Tariff Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, 
WT/REG/W/26, para. 32). 
48
 See WTO. (1995).Regionalism and the World Trading System  available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl67_e.htm  (accessed 6th October 2010). 
49
 WTO (2004). The Future of the WTO: Addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium, Report by the 
Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, WTO, Geneva. 
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an MFN basis, the proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements involving customs unions, 
regional and bilateral FTAs (RTAs and BTAs respectively) and other arrangements, has made 
MFN treatment an exception rather than the rule. “Certainly the term might now be better 
defined as LFN, Least- Favoured-Nation treatment.”50According to Baldwin and Thornson, the 
number of RTAs is impressive: all WTO members are engaged at least in one or more RTAs, 
excluding Mongolia.51 
In the traditional, conceptual debate on "regionalism vs. multilateralism", it has been argued that 
RTAs, by moving generally at a faster pace than the MTS and sharing its goals, represent a way 
of strengthening the latter.52 The positive effects of RTAs on the integration of developing 
countries in the world economy are also usually noted.53 
Proponents of the stumbling block theory emphasize that: (1) RTAs may promote costly trade 
diversion rather than efficient trade creation, especially when sizable MFN tariffs remain—these 
tariffs create vested interests to maintain preferential margins in “their” markets; (2) proliferating 
regional agreements absorb scarce negotiating resources (especially in poorer WTO members) 
and crowd out policymakers attention; (3) competing RTAs (especially different North-South 
East-West combinations) may lock in incompatible regulatory structures and standards, and may 
result in inappropriate norms for developing country partners; and (4) by creating alternative 
legal frameworks and dispute settlement mechanisms, RTAs may weaken the discipline and 
efficiency associated with a broadly recognized multilateral framework of rules.54The dispute 
settlement provisions contained in "new generation" RTAs, could build jurisprudence conflicting 
                                                          
50
 WTO (2004). The Future of the WTO: Addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium. 
51
 Baldwin, R. & Thorson, P.H. (2007). Multilateralising Regionalism: Ideas for a WTO action plan on regionalism. 
 Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London. 
52
 This view is expressed in Regionalism and the World Trading System, WTO Secretariat, 1995. 
53
 See Inventory of Non-Tariff Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG/W/26, para. 32. 
54
 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dispute Settlement 
Understanding generically referred to as the “DSU”. Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, reprinted in Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Legal Texts Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, which sets out the procedures and rules that define disputes system. 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
with that of the WTO.  This issue has risen in particular with respect to RTA clauses providing 
that, in the event of inconsistency, RTA rules prevail over WTO rules.  It has been argued that 
this could result in a diminution of the rights that the parties had under the WTO in relation to 
their trade with one another.55 
It has however been noted that such situation was not contemplated in the language calling for 
RTA rules to prevail in the event of inconsistency; that language was geared toward situations in 
which the RTA provisions went beyond WTO disciplines (i.e., WTO-Plus disciplines).Critics 
argue that by their nature RTAs divert trade, especially when the partner countries impose very 
high external tariffs. 56 This conceptual distinction was developed in 1950 by the eminent 
economist Jacob Viner.57 Viner saw RTAs to be trade creating when a RTA allows its members 
to replace the importation of expensive, inefficiently produced goods from a non-member with 
cheaper, more-efficiently-produced goods from other RTA members. A trade creating RTA, 
Viner postulated, make economically sensible trade more possible between member countries. 
                                                          
55
 The dispute settlement system under the DSU provides a mechanism through which WTO members can ensure 
that their rights under the WTO Agreement can be enforced. The respondent whose measure is under challenge has a 
forum to defend it if it disagrees with the claims raised by the complainant. In this way, the dispute settlement 
system serves to preserve the members’ rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement. Article 3.2 of the DSU 
provides in part: “The members recognize that dispute settlement system of the WTO serves to preserve the rights 
and obligations of Members under the covered agreements.”[emphasis added]. 
The ruling of the bodies involved (the DSB(Dispute settlement Body),the Appellate Body panels and arbitration) are 
intended to reflect and correctly apply the rights and obligations as they are set out in the WTO Agreement. They 
must not change the WTO law that is applicable between the parties or add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the WTO Agreement. (See Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU.). 
56
 See Trade diversion versus trade creation discussion by Jacob Viner. See also Donald A. Calvert How the 
Multilateral Trade System Under the World Trade Organization is Attempting to Reconcile the Contradiction & 
Hurdles posed by Regional Trade Agreements, An Analysis of  the Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
& Trade.( Unpublished Master’s Thesis, International Commerce & Policy Program School of Public policy George 
Mason University, Virginia ,2002). 
57
 See Viner, Jacob (1950).The Customs Unions issue. New York; Carnegie Endowment for international Peace. See 
also Denis O’Brian ‘Customs Unions trade creation and trade diversion in Historical Perspective’ [Electronic 
version]. History of political Economy 1976.8 (4):540-563. Retrieved October 24, 2010 from Duke University Press 
Journals Online at http://hope-dukejournals.org/cgi/pdf-extract./8/4/540. (accessed 24 October 2010). 
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On the other hand, Viner saw RTAs to be trade diverting when they foster inefficient commerce 
wherein a member because of the RTA’s rules, engages in unhealthy trade practices. Trade 
diversion occurs when a RTA member imports costly, less-efficiently produced goods from 
another RTA member rather than importing those same goods from a more efficient non-member 
only because the RTA artificially lowers the cost.58 
Building block proponents stress that moving forward in smaller steps is often easier to 
accomplish, and it creates a certain reform momentum: (1) regional/bilateral agreements can help 
sensitize domestic constituencies to liberalization and keep the stakes lower to allow for 
incremental progress on trade; 59 (2) expanding the number and coverage of RTAs can erode 
vested opposition to multilateral liberalization because each successive RTA reduces the value of 
the margin of preference, thereby reducing the discriminatory impact; (3) RTAs are often more 
about building strategic and/or political alliances or locking in domestic reforms than about 
actual trade liberalization, and so are not necessarily competitive with multilateral efforts; (4) 
regional arrangements can provide an incubator for developing country firms/producers to learn 
to trade with RTA partners without facing full global competition; and (5) for some issues, such 
as regulatory cooperation, RTAs may be viable. 
The principle of non-discrimination is one of the main reasons countries join the WTO.As a key 
concept of the GATT/WTO, indeed the cornerstone of the present world trading system is non-
discrimination between different sources of the same imported goods, which is achieved by 
requiring members to give each other most favoured nation treatment, expect in specified 
circumstances.60 It provides for a “level-playing field” for all members to trade goods and 
                                                          
58
 See Appendix A: Notes on Trade Creation, Diversion and Economic Efficiency available at 
http://www.piie.com/publications/Chapters-preview/326/appaiie311xp.df. (accessed 24 October 2010). 
59
 Bicycle theory, especially in between trade rounds, NAFTA, for example, provided an impetus to the Uruguay 
Round (Services and TRIMS) discussed by Edwini Kessie, WTO Rules on Regional Trade Agreement. Power Point 
presentation for 2010 Masters in International Trade and Investment Law programme at the University of the 
Western Cape. 
60
 WTO rules require that each member accord Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to other WTO members.  
However, GATT Article XXIV allows exceptions to the MFN principle for RTAs so long as they meet certain 
conditions: 
i) the agreement must lower trade barriers within the regional group.  
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services with one another. RTAs-by definition-provide trade benefits to other members at the 
exclusion and discrimination of non-members that should be protected from such discrimination 
under WTO rules.61 Despite this, the GATT’S and GATS’ founding fathers still recognised that 
RTAs could benefit the multilateral trade system. At the same time, they feared that, left 
unchecked, RTAs could damage and even weaken the world trade system. Their solution was to 
create a special provision-GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V –that allows for RTAs only 
when two conditions are met: 
i) The level of RTA’s trade barriers towards non-members are not “on the whole” higher or 
“more restrictive” than prior to the RTA’s formation; and 
ii) A RTA liberalizes “substantially all the trade” between its members.62 
GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V were in essence, an attempt to allow RTAs to exist 
within the larger system without damaging that system by having few certain disciplines. The 
hope was that Articles XXIV and V would permit RTAs as an interim exception to the WTO’s 
non-discrimination rule. So, GATT and GATS framers intended Articles XXIV and V to be the 
system’s instrument for both managing RTAs and encouraging their transformation into 
multilateral WTO trade agreements. Articles XXIV of GATT and V of GATS were designed to 
protect multilateralism. 
Of course, what the drafters could not foresee was the degree of the proliferation of RTAs in the 
later years. Certainly the drafters thought that the disciplines stipulated by Articles XXIV GATT 
and   article V GATS would protect the multilateral system from such proliferation. However, as 
the new millennium began, concerns about regionalism’s impact on the multilateral system was 
of such concern to trade policy makers that it was placed at the top of the agenda at the launch of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ii) the agreement cannot raise trade barriers against non-participating members.   
iii)  the agreement is supposed to cover substantially all trade among the RTA partners.  
 In reality, RTA participants seldom meet all these conditions.  Moreover, the trade coverage of many RTAs is 
incomplete with many "sensitive" sectors exempted from trade liberalization. 
61
 GATT Article I: 1 and GATS Article II: 1. 
62
 GATT Article XXIV, Paragraphs 5 and 8 and GATS Article V, Paragraphs 1 and 4. 
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the Doha Development Round of trade talks. In Doha trade ministers from WTO member 
countries agreed to re-examine RTA by “negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving 
disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade 
agreements.”63 It was further agreed that the negotiations were to take into account the 
development aspects of the regional trade agreements because the ministers recognized that 
regional trade agreements plays an important role in the liberalisation promotion, trade 
expansion and fosters development.64 
1.6.4. Why are RTAs proliferating? 
Despite the WTO Report in 2004,65 criticizing the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade 
agreements on the grounds that it had made the most-favoured nation (MFN) principle the 
exception rather than the rule, and has led to the increased discrimination in the world trade, the 
surge in RTAs has continued unabated and the negations of new RTAs are still in place. As of 31 
July 2010, some 474 RTAs worldwide counting goods and services notifications separately, had 
been notified to the GATT/WTO.66 Of these, 351 RTAs were notified under Article XXIV of the 
GATT 1947 or GATT 1994; 31 under the Enabling Clause; and 92 under Article V of the GATS. 
At that same date, 283 agreements were in force.67 The overall number of RTAs in force has 
been increasingly steadily, a trend likely to be strengthened by the many RTAs currently under 
negotiation. Of these RTAs, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and partial scope agreements 
                                                          
63
 See Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, Para 29, WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1, Adopted on November 
14, 2001. 
64
 See Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, Para 4, WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1, Adopted on November 
14, 2001. 
65
 Minter Ellison ‘The Future of the WTO: Report by the Consultative Board to the WTO Director General’ 
Published March 31, 2005 – Australia available at http://www.hg.org/articles/article_677.html  (accessed 6 October 
2010). 
66
 See WTO|Regional Trade Agreement gateway: Regional trade agreement information available at  
http://www.wto/eglish/tratop-e/region-ehtm . (accessed 25 October 2010). 
67
 For up to date information on WTO figures on RTAs currently in force, please consult the summary tables 
contained in the WTO RTA Database. 
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account for 90%, while customs unions account for 10%.There are several reasons for rapid 
growth in the number of trade agreements.68  
These are: 
a) Disappointment with the MTS, Tokyo Round and Uruguay Round. 
One explanation often given is that the explosion of RTAs has followed the failure of 
multilateralism in the form of the WTO.The Tokyo Round for example, had mixed results. It 
failed to come to grips with the fundamental problems affecting farm trade and also stopped 
short of providing a modified agreement on “safeguards” (emergency import measures).69 
Nevertheless, a series of agreements on non-tariff barriers did emerge from the negotiations, in 
some cases interpreting existing GATT rules, in others breaking entirely new ground.70 In most 
cases, only a relatively small number of (mainly industrialized) GATT members subscribed to 
these agreements and arrangements. Because they were not accepted by the full GATT 
membership, they were often informally called “codes.”71 They were not multilateral, but they 
were a beginning. Several codes were eventually amended in the Uruguay Round and turned into 
                                                          
68
 A succinct exposition of this explanation can be found in Bhagwati, J ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An 
Overview’ in Jaime, D, and Panagariya (eds) A New Dimensions in Regional Integration and Krueger, A. ‘Free trade 
agreements as protectionist devices: Rules of Origin’ in Jaime, D., and Panagariya (eds), A New Dimensions in 
Regional Integration, (1993)22-57.These papers also appear in the World Bank ICEPR Volume on regionalism. 
69
 See WTO| Understanding the WTO ‘Basics, The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh; The Tokyo Round: A 
first try to reform the system’ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (accessed 
25 October 2010). 
70
  See WTO| Understanding the WTO ‘Basics, The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh; The Tokyo Round: A 
first try to reform the system’ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (accessed 
25 October 2010). 
This means new areas never covered before in the international trade and at a multilateral forum were covered in this 
negotiation . 
71The Tokyo Round negotiations (1973-1979) developed agreements on anti-dumping measures, government 
procurement, technical barriers to trade - sometimes called the Standards Code and other non-tariff measures which 
were all known as “codes.” Others include Subsidies and countervailing measures - interpreting Articles VI, XVI 
and XXIII of GATT ,Import licensing procedures ,Customs valuation - interpreting Article 7,Anti-dumping - 
interpreting Article 6, replacing the Kennedy Round code ,Bovine Meat Arrangement ,International Dairy 
Arrangement and the Trade in Civil Aircraft. 
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multilateral commitments accepted by all WTO members.72 Only four remained “plurilateral” — 
those on government procurement, bovine meat, civil aircraft and dairy products.73 In 1997 WTO 
members agreed to terminate the bovine meat and dairy agreements, leaving only two.74 On the 
other hand, all is told, the Uruguay Round’s achievements were quite “remarkable.    They met 
many of the expectations leading up to what may now rightly be referred  to as the “negotiations 
of the century”, at least as far as international trade is concerned. Nonetheless, it is clear that the 
very wide scope of the negotiations and the far-reaching aims of the initial programme were also 
weakness which prevented the achievement of completely satisfactory results for all countries 
and all areas. It asserted that regional integration has prospered as an alternative to 
multilateralism since multilateral trade negotiations have become too cumbersome to deal with 
today's complex trade issues. This argument, first introduced when the Uruguay Round proved 
difficult to conclude, has re-emerged as the Doha Round is proving difficult to conclude.75 
David Kernohan and T. Huw Edwards opined in their paper,76 that the indefinite prorogation of 
the WTO’s Doha trade talks in July 2006 suggested that the global appetite for multilateralism 
had weakened. They stated particularly in their paper that “The collapse – or strictly speaking 
                                                          
72
 See Uruguay Round Final Act and Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. In World 
Trade Organization The Legal Texts, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (2002) 
Geneva.Switzerland.The WTO’s agreements are often called the Final Act of the 1986–1994 Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations, although strictly speaking the Final Act is the first of the agreement. 
73
 See Annex 4 of Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. In World Trade Organization 
The Legal Texts, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, (2002) Geneva. 
Switzerland.          
74
 See Edmond M. ‘International Trade Regulation’ available at http://www.ppl.nl/bibliographies/wto/files/2427.pdf   
(accessed 25 October 2010). 
75
 The Doha Ministerial Declaration set deadlines have not been met. The Declaration set a deadline  for completing 
the negotiations in 1st January 2005.In the operational part of the relevant  section of the Declaration it provides 
that:“The Declarations adopted by WTO Members at the Conference constitute a work programme,incuding trade 
negotiations to be concluded no later than 1 January 2005” originally, unofficially by end of  2006.The only 
exceptions were the negotiation on improving and clarifying the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which was to be 
concluded by the end of May 2003 and the negotiations on a registration system for geographical indications ,to 
conclude by the Fifth Ministerial Conference in 2003. 
76
 David K. T. & Huw E. ‘The fall of Doha and the rise of regionalism? ’(2006) CEPS Policy Brief No.111 
September. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) available at http://www.ceps.be. (accessed 25 October 
2010). 
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prorogation – of the WTO talks suggests that the enthusiasm for multilateralism, and even the 
world economic order, may be diminishing.”77 
b) Doha Ministerial Declaration treatment of the Singapore issues. 
The so-called “Singapore issues” have been perhaps the most contentious of the issues that have 
been discussed or negotiated in the World Trade Organisation since its establishment in 1995.78 
The issues are investment, competition policy, government procurement and trade facilitation. 
The first three of these are strictly non-trade issues, and much of the controversy has been on 
whether issues that are not directly related to trade should be allowed to be negotiated as treaties 
in the WTO, which is after all a trade organisation. It is agreed that the fourth issue is related to 
trade, and the debate has been on whether there should be binding multilateral rules in the WTO 
on this issue.79  
Before Doha most developing countries were resistant to the developed countries’ push on the 
new issues, as evidenced by the decisions and declarations of the LDCs Ministerial Conference 
in Zanzibar and the African Trade Ministers Meeting in Abuja.80  
                                                          
77David K. T. & Huw E. ‘The fall of Doha and the rise of regionalism? ’(2006) CEPS Policy Brief No.111 
September. 
78
 For more details and discussion on how the issues were introduced in the WTO and their evolution from the 
Singapore Ministerial meeting in 1996 to the Seattle Ministerial meeting in 1999 and Doha Ministerial meeting in 
2001. The events at the Cancun Ministerial meeting in 2003 and the developments after Cancun up to the decision at 
the WTO General Council in July 2004. See Martin Khor, paper, The "Singapore Issues" in the WTO: Implications 
and Recent Developments. The paper describes the main features of the four issues and analyses the implications for 
development if the issues were introduced as subjects of negotiations and agreements in the WTO. Finally the paper 
alludes to the fact that these issues may be revived as subjects of negotiations in the WTO or other trade agreements 
in the future. The paper is available at http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01284 (accessed 
28 October 2010). 
79
 See World Trade Organization ‘Investment, competition, procurement, simpler procedures’. In Understanding the 
WTO. (2008) 72-73. 
80
 See “ACP Declaration on the Fourth Ministerial Conferences,” Brussels, 5 to 6 November 2001. Communication 
from Kenya, World Trade Organization, 9th November, 2001, WT/L/430(01-5574). This document affirmed that 
ACP States were not prepared at that time to engage in negotiations on Singapore issues. Thus they called for the 
continuation of the work of various working groups that had been established to study the respective Singapore 
issues. See paragraphs 22 and 23 of the document. 
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Due to a series of unusual or even unique procedures, the views and positions of many of the 
developing countries in key areas (including the Singapore issues) were not adequately reflected, 
not reflected at all or ignored in the drafts of the Ministerial Declaration that were prepared in 
Geneva and transmitted to the Doha meeting.81 As a result, a decision was made in Doha that 
negotiations would begin on the four Singapore issues after the Fifth Ministerial, but only on the 
basis of an explicit consensus on modalities. In the operational part of the relevant paragraphs 
(20 on investment, 23 on competition, 26 on transparency in government procurement and 27 on 
trade facilitation) the wording is as follows: "….we agree that negotiations will take place after 
the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit 
consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations." This implied that a decision had 
already been taken in principle to start negotiations towards new agreements, and only the 
modalities of the negotiations had to be agreed to. 
Developing countries have taken the phrase “…on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit 
consensus”, to mean clearly that a decision was to be expressly taken by parties to allow 
negotiations on Singapore issues and as far as they are concerned no decision had been reached 
on the negotiations. Paragraph 22 of the ACP Declaration on the Fourth Ministerial 
Conferences,82 provided that: 
“We recall the Singapore Ministerial Decision on Investment and Competition Policy, 
that: “it is clearly understood that future negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral 
disciplines in these areas (investment, competition policy, government procurement and 
trade facilitation), will take place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken among 
WTO members regarding such negotiations”. [emphasis added]. 
                                                          
81
 See Martin Khor ‘The "Singapore Issues" in the WTO: Implications and Recent Developments.’(2003) 
[Electronic version]. Policy innovations, Third World Network (TWN), Nov 1 available at 
 http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01284. (accessed 28 October 2010). 
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 See “ACP Declaration on the Fourth Ministerial Conferences,” Brussels. 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 The Geneva draft,83 committed members to start negotiations on the Singapore issues which was 
not their view.84This failure to reflect developing countries views added to the frustration of the 
developing countries, which felt that the drafting process was untransparent, and the drafts were 
unrepresentative. They had requested that the draft to be transmitted to Doha should contain the 
different positions of various countries or groupings (instead of being a "clean draft" which 
would give the mistaken impression that it was a consensus document) or that these differences 
be at least made clear in a covering letter. However, these requests were rejected and a "clean 
text" that reflected the views of the proponents of the "new issues" became the basis of 
negotiations in Doha, placing the developing countries at a great disadvantage. This procedure of 
“sending a clean text to the Ministerial” was in contrast to the practice before Seattle, when a text 
denoting differing positions had been prepared, which was a more honest presentation, giving a 
chance for the different positions to be reflected in the text and thus to be considered in the 
negotiations at the Ministerial meeting.85 
WTO member states’ dissatisfaction with the way Singapore issues were handled has triggered 
them to negotiate for RTAs that include competition policy.86 According to the UNCTAD 
                                                          
83
 Geneva Draft refers to the Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1, Adopted 
on November 14, 2001. 
84
 See TWN, Third World Network. (2003).African countries against negotiating Singapore issues available at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/5323a.htm.  (accessed 28 October 2010). 
85
 See Job (99)/4797/Rev.3. (6986)18.November1999. Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference. 
Compilation of Proposals Submitted in Phase 2 of the Preparatory Process Informal Note by the Secretariat, 
Revision. Following the suggestion by the Chairman at the meeting of the General Council on 29 July, the 
Secretariat circulated a compilation of proposals submitted in Phase 2 broadly organized around the subject list of 
issues identified in Job (99)/3978/Rev.9.The compilation reproduced the full texts of the specific proposals 
presented in the submissions by Members, as well as the full texts of submissions not in the form of specific 
proposals.  The compilation also included all submissions circulated as at 18 November (up to and including 
WT/GC/W/391) available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/min99_e.htm.   (accessed 28 
October 2010) 
86
 Simon, J.Evenett ‘What can we really learn from the competition provisions of RTAs? ’in Philippe, B.et al. (eds). 
Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to Assure Development Gains. (2005) 37-63.  See also 
Peter Holmes, Anestis Papadopoulos, Bahri özgür Kayali and Anna Sydorak.  ‘Trade and Competition in RTAs: A 
missed opportunity?’ in Philippe, B.et al. (eds).Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to 
Assure Development Gains.  (2005)65-109 available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20051_en.pdf. 
(accessed 28 October 2010) 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
(2005),87 of the 300-odd bilateral and regional trade agreements in force or in negotiation, over 
100 contain provisions related to competition policy. A number of actual or proposed bilateral 
and regional agreements, such as NAFTA and the Free Trade Area of the Americas already 
contain sections on competition policy. The aim of those pushing for competition policy to be 
included in free trade agreements is to curtail the discretion and flexibility of host governments 
in regulating the entry and operations of foreign firms, and to prevent any favourable treatment 
being given to domestic firms. Meanwhile, the EU has also been criticized for insisting on the 
inclusion of competition policy in its Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries.88 
 
 
c) Economic reasons. 
Regional trade agreements are controversial in economics, not simply because of the so-called 
‘Vinerian’ 89 view that they can sometimes reduce trade by diverting it, rather than creating it, 
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 UNCTAD World investment Report 2005, Transnational corporations and the internationalization of R&D 
Statistical annex, (2005) United Nations, New York and Geneva. 
88See Vicente Paolo B. Yu III. Development Challenges of Competition Policy in the Economic Partnership 
Agreements. (2007) South Centre available at http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article9732. (accessed 24 October 
2010). The European Union has a long history of aggressively pushing for competition rules in international trade 
negotiations. Attempts by the EU to place competition on the WTO negotiating agenda have been staunchly opposed 
by developing countries including African, Caribbean and pacific countries. But in July 2004, the WTO General 
Council decided that negotiations on, inter alia, competition policy would not form part of the Doha trade 
negotiations. See WT/L/579, 2 August 2004, para. 1(g).Developing countries have rejected international 
negotiations on competition on the grounds that adopting such rules would be inimical to development. Having 
failed to place competition on the WTO agenda, the EU is now looking to bilateral free trade negotiations. 
Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations are no exception. The EU has requested all ACP regions to negotiate 
on competition rules. CARIFORUM, CEMAC, and COMESA regions are currently negotiating competition 
provisions with the EU. SADC, ECOWAS, and Pacific countries have until now refused to include competition 
policy in negotiations. The EU is insistent and has tabled chapters on competition to SADC and ECOWAS. 
89
  See Viner, Jacob (1950).The Customs Unions issue. New York; Carnegie Endowment for international Peace. 
See also Denis O’Brian ‘Customs Unions trade creation and trade diversion in Historical Perspective’ [Electronic 
version]. History of political Economy 1976.8 (4):540-563. Retrieved October 24, 2010 from Duke University Press 
Journals Online at http://hope-dukejournals.org/cgi/pdf-extract./8/4/540. (accessed 24 October 2010). 
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but also because of the unresolved disagreements over when a regional trade agreement is likely 
to precede, rather than preclude, more global agreements. 
As a starting point, economists have long argued that preferential trade liberalisation is desirable 
if the volume of imports by member countries from the rest of the world does not decline on a 
product-by-product basis after the implementation of the agreement. The main economic benefits 
of Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs) must therefore stem from increased trade among the 
members after the formation of the RTA.90 On the other hand, the 'multilateralists' argue that 
RTAs imply diversion of trade from non-RTA members.91Countries are scrambling to avoid 
being 'excluded' from markets by getting into any RTA they can. But this argument can only 
hold for small countries and cannot explain how relatively large countries of North America, 
Europe and South-East Asia have been at the forefront of sponsoring RTA activity. 
The record has been somewhat better with agreements involving industrialized countries (such as 
the EC), where RTAs generally are considered to have stimulated increased trade and economic 
growth. There are several reasons for this different outcome.92 First, industrialized countries have 
exploited gains from intra-industry specialization and product differentiation, which are more 
important in larger, high income markets. Expansion in intra-industry trade has been a clear 
outcome in the EC. But in poorer countries where the market for differentiated products is more 
limited, intra-industry trade has not increased. Second, trade creation appears to have been 
relatively larger in industrial country RTAs, at least partially because member countries were 
                                                          
90
 See the provisions of GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V –that allows for RTAs only when two conditions 
are met: 
i) The level of RTA’s trade barriers towards non-members are not “ on the whole” higher or “more 
restrictive” than prior to the RTA’s formation ;and 
ii) A RTA liberalizes “substantially all the trade” between its members. 
91
 See Bhagwati J Termites in the Trading system: How preferential Agreements undermine Free Trade (2008) 50. 
92
 See de la Torre, Augusto & Margaret R. Kelly. (1992).Regional Trade Arrangements. Occasional Paper No. 93. 
International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.and de Melo, Jaime and S. Dhar (1992).Lessons of Trade 
Liberalization in Latin America for Economies in Transition. Policy Research WPS No. 1040, The World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 
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more integrated before the agreement and lastly, RTAs in high-income countries have a much 
better record of actually implementing agreed policy changes, often ahead of schedule. 
Baldwin points out "almost all empirical studies of European and North American arrangements 
find positive impacts on member's living standards.”93In the period 1990-97, imports from other 
members of these arrangements increased on average at some 15 per cent a year, while imports 
from non-members increased at 10 per cent.94 The decline in trade following the financial crisis 
had a similar effect overall on members and non-members.95 On the other hand, there have 
certainly been concerns expressed in the Caribbean 96 about the negative effects of NAFTA on 
their trade. Yeats 97 claims evidence of trade diversion in MERCOSUR. While Laird,98 claims 
that protection of certain sectors such as automobiles certainly limits market opportunities in 
MERCOSUR, overall these countries are now much more open than they were in the 1980s, and 
imports from third countries have also been growing rapidly. It is, therefore, important to look 
carefully at the dynamics of particular agreements. On a simple comparative static analysis, third 
parties may be adversely affected by trade diversion and a reduction in their terms of trade, but 
this is less obvious on the basis of a crude dynamic analysis, especially in the case of the faster 
growing RTAs. Nevertheless, the fact is that trade within RTAs has been generally growing 
much faster than trade from non-members. An analysis of seven regional integration agreements 
(APEC, the European Union, NAFTA, ASEAN, CEFTA, MERCOSUR and the Andean 
                                                          
93
 See Baldwin, R.E. ‘The Causes of Regionalism.’(1997) 20 The World Economy 7 865. 
94
 See Jo-Ann Crawford & Sam Laird. Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO.  Paper prepared for a meeting of 
the North American Economic and Finance Association in Boston, 6-9 January 2000. 
95
 See Jo-Ann Crawford & Sam Laird. Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO.  
96
 See Multilateralism and Regionalism in a Globalizing World: A Perspective from Asia-Pacific Region. Keynote 
Speech by Cae-One Kim. 
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 Yeats, A. (1997).Does MERCOSUR's Trade performance justify Concerns about the effects of Regional trade 
agreements? PPR Working Paper 1729, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
98
 Laird, S. (1998) MERCOSUR: Objectives and Achievements, Proceedings of Third Annual World Bank 
Conference on Development in Latin America and the Caribbean on "Trade: Towards Open Regionalism", June 29 - 
July 1, 1997, Montevideo, Uruguay, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 
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Community) shows that, on average, imports from other members of these arrangements 
increased both for members and non-members.99 
On the other hand trade between EAC members has grown over the past decade.100 Between 
1991 and 2002 the share of exports to the region tripled, reaching 18 percent in 2002.The share 
of regionally sourced imports increased four-fold over the same period, accounting for about 10 
percent in 2002.101 
It’s worth noting that countries perceive benefits of membership in RTAs, and become 
increasingly unwilling to forgo them. But another, more maligned reason is that countries suffer 
from being left out, and it is this that creates the rush to join. So how does the existence of RTAs 
affect non-member countries? The first is through the change in trade flows caused by a RTA, 
causing both the exports and imports of non-member countries to be smaller than they would 
otherwise be. That is, the fall in demand for their exports (and reduction in supply of imports) 
may reduce their export price (and raise their import price).Another source of loss from non-
membership of RTAs is the risk attached to being isolated if a trade war occurs. Of course, all 
countries-inside or outside RTAs-will usually lose from a trade war, but countries in RTAs have 
the insurance of knowing that they will still have trade with partner countries. 
In conclusion RTAs have economic benefits when they create trade between members. It is 
important to have a balance in RTAs in Steven Radelet’s words: 
 “... [F]ormal RIAs have worked best when they have built on previous steps towards 
openness and integration. They have not worked well when they were a first step towards 
                                                          
99
 Laird, S. (1998) MERCOSUR: Objectives and Achievements. 
100
 Steven Radelet (1997). ‘Regional Integration and Cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Are Formal Trade 
Agreements the Right Strategy?  Development Discussion Paper No. 592. Harvard Institute for International 
Development Harvard University. 
101
 See International Monetary Fund (2003). World Economic and Financial Surveys World Economic Outlook 
Database available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/index.aspx. (accessed 24 October 
2010). See also chapter 3 of this thesis for more detailed empirical study, analysis and discussion on effects and 
benefits of RTAs on East African Community (EAC). 
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openness, and have had especially poor outcomes when they acted as a substitute for more 
fundamental trade liberalization.”102 
d) Geopolitical considerations. 
The geopolitical dimension on the formation of RTAs should not be overlooked. By linking their 
economies together so that they become more interdependent, countries reduce the likelihood of 
conflict between.RTAs that have traditionally occurred among geographically contiguous 
countries with already well-established trading patterns; prime examples include the NAFTA 
countries, the EC, ASEAN, groupings in sub-Saharan African such as UEMOA and SACU, and 
in the Western Hemisphere, notably CARICOM, the CACM and MERCOSUR. This premise is 
further strengthened by the ongoing efforts by most of these regional groups to deepen intra-
regional integration. Developing a common economic purpose and acting together in group of 
nations can enhance the group nation bargaining power and sovereignty.103 The current EU owes 
much of its origins to western Europeans desire to establish a system that locked the economies 
of France and Germany together so that they were never likely to go to war against one another 
again.104 Political benefits would be associated from security, wider cooperation and the “locking 
in” of reforms. 
1.6.5. Conclusion. 
Regional preferential trading arrangements have mushroomed in every region of the world. 
Several factors underlie the proliferation of RTAs.The chapter has given an examination of the 
impact of regional arrangements on the global trading system; it then briefly reviewed the larger 
debate over whether RTAs contribute to or weaken and damage the multilateral system. 
Throughout this chapter the theoretical work has been illustrated by referring to existing 
RTAs.Empirical evidence has been used to underscore the points made. It is clear from the topics 
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 See Steven Radelet (1997). Regional Integration and Cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Are Formal Trade 
Agreements the Right Strategy? 
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 Schiff, M.and L.A.Winters ‘Regional integration as Diplomacy’ (1998)12 World Bank Economic Review 2 274. 
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covered that the RTAs of whatever depth cannot be said to be good or bad unequivocally for 
individual members. Consequently, the analysis of trade creation and trade diversion in this 
chapter suggest a cautious assessment of regional trade agreements. Whether RTAs, are good or 
bad for their participants, the non-member and for the wider multilateral trading system has long 
been debated by economists measuring trade creation against trade diversion as one way of 
calculating their effects on members and non-member. Several reasons for rapid growth in the 
number of trade agreements were also explained.  
From the discussion in this chapter, the impact of regionalism is good and the only conclusion 
made is that regionalism and multilateral trade have had a complimentary relationship. The next 
chapter gives an overview of the relevant WTO rules and procedures for preferential Trade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
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2.0 AN OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT WTO RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR 
PREFERENTIAL TRADE. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION. 
Based upon the fundamental principle of Most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment enshrined in 
Article I of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter GATT),105 Article II of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services 106 and other agreements, and hence the obligation to 
accord immediately and unconditionally all privileges accorded to any country to all Member 
States of the WTO, regional trade agreements are bound to be an exception to this principle.107 
Such exceptions exist both in goods and services, as well as intellectual property.108  WTO rules 
both allow and contain regional trade. They serve the purposes of preventing macroeconomic 
disequilibrium between MFN and regional trade as well as correcting them. In substance, WTO 
rules reflect a policy of encouragement and containment of regional trade.109 They are an attempt 
to encourage trade creation, and to avoid trade diversion.110 The substantive rules relating to RTAs 
for goods are contained in Paragraphs 4 through 10 of GATT Article XXIV, as clarified in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations.111 This Article includes both internal and external conditions 
applicable to the creation of Free Trade Areas (hereinafter FTAs) and Customs Unions ( 
hereinafter CU).The internal requirements deal with the legal relationship among the constituent 
                                                          
105
 See Article I of the Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947.The General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade came into force on 1St January 1948. 
106
 See General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter GATS). 
107
 See generally William J. Davey / Joost Pauwelyn, ‘MFN-Unconditionality: A Legal Analysis of the Concept in 
View of its Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with Particular Reference to the Issue of “Like Product,’ in 
Thomas Cottier / Petros C. Mavroidis (eds.), Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in World 
Trade Law: Past, Present, and Future (2000) 13 22-25. 
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111
 See Youri Devuyst & Asja Serdarevic, ‘The World Trade Organization and Regional Trade Agreement Bridging 
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parties to the custom union and free trade area while the external requirements concern the 
relationship between the RTA members  and third parties.112 This chapter therefore gives an 
overview of all WTO rules designed to protect multilateralism by facilitating and promoting the 
trade between the RTA parties. The rules manage RTAs formation and encourage their 
transformation into the multilateral trading system. 
2.2. MULTILATERAL DISCIPLINES ON REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. 
When a WTO member enters into a regional trade agreement it departs from the main pillars of 
non-discrimination.113 However, RTAs are governed by Article XXIV of GATT 1994,114 Article 
V of the GATS115 and the Enabling Clause.116 All these provisions allow WTO members to 
depart from the cornerstone principle of the MFN under certain conditions, and establish the 
requirements to be fulfilled by members of RTAs to be compatible with the WTO.117 RTAs are 
therefore a major and growing feature of the multilateral trading system. They show an 
increasing level of sophistication both in terms of scope and configuration. The coverage of 
                                                          
112
 See Youri Devuyst & Asja Serdarevic, ‘The World Trade Organization and Regional Trade Agreement Bridging 
the Constitutional Credibility Gap,’ (2007). 
113
 The relevant non-discrimination principles of the WTO are the National treatment (Article I) and the Most 
Favored Nation Treatment (Article III). The main principle of Article I is that member states are not allowed to 
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discriminate among other WTO member trading partners. 
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 See Text of Article XXIV, Interpretative Note ad Article XXIV and Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. 
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  See GATS Article V generally .This is the equivalent of Art XXIV in the field of trade in Services.  Before the 
GATS, the services component of RTAs was not examined.  
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 The Enabling Clause (i.e., the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and 
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For further explanation of the enabling clause and the full text of the clause refer to, available at 
 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm,(accessed  12 December 2010). 
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  See Mashayeki M., & Ito, T. (eds) Multilateralism and Regionalism: the New Interface. (2005)UNCTAD, New 
York and Geneva. 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
RTAs varies significantly from partial scope agreements to very comprehensive RTAs.118 But 
given its political appeal and its likely spread, it is important to contain and shape it in the ways 
that it becomes maximally useful and minimally damaging and consonant with the objectives of 
arriving at multilateral free trade for all.119  
At the Doha Ministerial Conference, launching a new round of negotiations, for example, WTO 
members in recognition of systemic challenge that RTAs pose for the WTO system, stressed 
their commitment to the WTO as   “the unique forum for global trade rule-making and 
liberalization, while also recognizing that regional trade agreements can play an important role 
in promoting the liberalization and expansion of trade and in fostering development.” 120 GATT 
Article XXIV requirements, which apply to FTAs, CUs and “interim arrangement” leading to 
either FTAs or CUs, essentially provide that duties and other regulations of commerce should be 
eliminated for “substantially all the trade” among RTA members, and that the barriers placed in 
the way of third countries should not be “on the whole higher or more restrictive.”121 These 
requirements are not applicable under the Enabling Clause. The Enabling Clause provides that 
the MFN clause of GATT Article I.1 is exempted for a limited number of preferential 
arrangements, including “regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed 
countries for the mutual reduction of tariff reduction or elimination of tariffs.”122 Thus, it can be 
argued that the Enabling Clause sets out less stringent requirements than those contained in 
GATT Article XXIV. 
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 See WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the GATT/WTO and in force: Basic Table, available at 
http://www.wto.or/English/tratop-e/region-e/summary-exls. (accessed 2 November 2010). 
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 See Bhagwati, J ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview’ in Jaime, D, and Panagariya (eds) A New 
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2.3. SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE XXIV OF GATT 
AND ARTICLE V OF GATS. 
Both article XXIV GATT and article V GATS sets out a number of substantial requirements for 
the conclusion of CU, FTAs and economic integration agreements in trade in goods and services 
respectively. For services, whenever a bilateral agreement affects trade in services, the relevant 
provisions are “multilateralized” via Art.II:1 of GATS the guiding provision for the MFN 
principle. Many WTO countries are reluctant to make substantial commitments multilaterally 
and a growing number of them resort to including goods and services in preferential agreements 
as a means of improving access to foreign markets as well as developing and establishing 
international rules on trade in goods and services. To protect the MFN principle and to reduce 
trade-distortive effects of preferential trade agreements, the establishment of a number of 
pertinent requirements which preferential agreements on goods and services must meet in order 
to be legally compatible with the multilateral system is therefore necessary.  RTAs compatibility 
disciplines are laid out in Article XXIV of the GATT— others are and include the Understanding 
on its Interpretation,123 and Article V of GATS.124  
2.3.0. Substantially all trade coverage versus Substantial sectoral coverage. 
A free trade agreement or agreement establishing a custom union needs to cover substantially all 
the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in the territories of the parties 
to the agreement. Similarly, the Agreement on services requires substantial sectoral coverage.  
Substantial sectoral coverage is defined as a condition “understood in terms of number of 
sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply. In order to meet this condition, [the] 
agreement [...] should not provide for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply.” 125 This 
means that RTAs for trade in services should, in principle, be applicable to all modes of supply 
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 See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.  
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defined in GATS.126 GATS article V: 1(a) which provides for substantial trade coverage is based 
upon, and imports into GATS, the key concept of “substantially all trade” in Article XXIV: 8 
GATT 1994.Unlike in GATT, the wording of the provision and of the footnote clarifies that the 
requirement entails both quantitative and qualitative requirements. The GATS clearly prescribes 
the adoption of a combined, quantitative and qualitative approach, and does not allow one to 
argue exclusively on the basis of one or the other approach as under Article XXIV GATT 1994 
which is silent on approach to adopt since the concept of "substantially all the trade" coverage 
under GATT Article XXIV provisions has not been clearly defined. This ambiguity has given 
rise to controversy in the past and difficulties are still encountered over its exact interpretation. 
An attempt to define the term was in the dispute Turkey –Restrictions on Imports of Textile and 
Clothing Products (hereinafter Turkey – Textiles) case,127 where the Panel expressed the view 
that “the ordinary meaning of the term “substantially” in the context of sub-paragraph 8(a) 
appears to provide for both qualitative and quantitative components”. The Appellate Body latter 
confirmed this view stating that the test in Article XXIV.8 required a certain percentage of trade 
to be liberalized and also the non-exclusion of any major sector of economic activity. The word 
“substantial” did not mean “all”, but it required “something considerably more than merely some 
of the trade.” Various other Reports of Working Parties on agreements presented under 
Article XXIV also include statements that the meaning of “substantially all the trade” has never 
been defined in GATT.128  It was also stated that Article XXIV:8(b) had to be interpreted to mean 
free trade in all products and not carved out by sectors;  the exclusion of a whole sector, no matter 
what percentage of current trade it constituted was contrary to the spirit of both Article XXIV and 
the General Agreement.129 This  different interpretations of “substantially all the trade” as to 
whether it refers to RTA trade in substantially all product sectors or substantial trade in all 
product sectors combined continues to impede the effective examination of RTAs under the 
WTO.This ambiguity was not clarified by the Understanding on GATT Article XXIV; despite 
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 See GATS Article I: 2. 
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the inclusion of the fourth paragraph in the Preamble to the 1994 Understanding,130 which did 
not offer any clear definition of the concept and the interpretation of that expression has thus 
remained contentious.  Two approaches, not mutually exclusive, are typical in that respect: 
• A qualitative approach sees the requirement as meaning that no sector (or at least no 
major sector) is to be kept out of intra-RTA trade liberalization; this approach aims at 
preventing the exclusion from RTA liberalization of any sector where the restrictive 
policies in place before the formation of the RTA hindered trade, which could be well the 
case if a quantitative approach was used. 
• A quantitative approach favours the definition of a statistical benchmark, such as a 
certain percentage of the trade between RTA parties, to indicate that the coverage of a 
given RTA fulfils the requirement.131 
On the other hand, participants in RTAs have tended to interpret the term as referring to the 
whole (horizontal) trade coverage and not to specific sectors. This interpretation allows certain 
latitude as regards the product sectors covered. For example, many of the customs union and free 
trade agreements concluded by the EU have excluded the agriculture sector or certain portions of 
it, but which nevertheless cover a substantial portion of the overall trade between the EU and the 
parties concerned. These agreements, as far as the EU is concerned,132  meet the "substantially 
all trade” feature. Other countries favour a definition that takes a sector-by-sector approach 
arguing that for this particular provision to be satisfied, no major sector of economic activity 
                                                          
130
 “Recognizing also that such contribution … if any major sector of trade is excluded.” 
131
 See The Report of the Sub-group of the Committee on the “European Economic Community” which examined the 
consistency with Article XXIV of the EEC Treaty provisions for the association of overseas territories notes that the 
EEC member States proposed the following definition of the term “substantially all”:  “a free-trade area should be 
considered as having been achieved for substantially all the trade when the volume of liberalized trade reached 80 per 
cent of total trade”( See L/778, adopted on 29 November 1957, 6S/70, 99, para. 30). The same Report reflects different 
views as to whether a quantitative assessment of the trade liberalization within the free trade areas between the 
European and the overseas territories should be based, as suggested by the EEC States, on the total volume of trade 
including the intra-European trade among the EEC States or, as suggested by other contracting parties, solely on the 
trade between the EEC as a whole and the associated overseas territories. 
132
 See GATT, Report submitted by the Committee on Treaty of Rome to the Contracting Parties, on 29th November 
1957, Annex IV 30 L 778/ (Nov. 29 1957). 
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should be excluded from the coverage of the free trade/customs union. Proponents of sector-by 
sector interpretation of substantially all trade argue that the EU agreements mentioned 
previously, by excluding the agricultural sector or parts of it, do not conform to the substantially 
all trade coverage feature.133 The precise extent of liberalization needed for an RTA to meet the 
“substantial sectoral coverage” test thus remains to be resolved.134 
2.3.1. The agreement must lower trade barriers within the regional group.  
Lowering trade barriers is one of the most obvious means of encouraging trade. The barriers 
concerned include customs duties (or tariffs) and measures such as import bans or quotas that 
restrict quantities selectively.135 Regional trade agreements therefore need to dismantle all tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions within a reasonable length of time. In the field of goods duties and 
other restrictive regulations of trade should be eliminated on substantially all trade between the 
constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to"substantially all trade" in products 
originating in such territories.136 Apart from this requirement, union members may still "where 
necessary" maintain duties or restrictions permitted under GATT Articles XI (quantitative 
restrictions); XII (restrictions applied for balance-of-payments reasons); XIII (non-
discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions); XIV (exceptions to the rule of non-
discrimination), XV (exchange arrangements); and XX (general exceptions).137The same is true 
in services. Article V: 1(b) of GATS provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all 
discrimination and the granting of national treatment between or among the parties, in the sectors 
covered through: 
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or 
                                                          
133
 See Chapter 4 of this thesis for the suggestions and recommendations on the issue. 
134
  See Chapter 4 of this thesis for more elaboration. 
135
 See World Trade Organization, Trading into the Future 2ed, (2001)1, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/doload-e/tif.pdf. (accessed 6 January 2011). Freer trade: gradually through 
negotiations. 
136
  See Article XXIV: 8(a) (i) of GATT 1947.  
137
 See Article XXIV: 8(a) (ii) of GATT 1947. 
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(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, either at the entry into force of that 
agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame, except for measures permitted 
under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis.  
In conclusion if a regional group has five members as the East Africa Community,138 for 
example, one of the conditions to be fulfilled by their formation agreement is that the barriers 
which will prevent trade between the five members should be totally removed to facilitate trade 
between them within the RTA.  
2.3.2. The agreement should not raise trade barriers against non-participating members.   
GATT Article XXIV: 5(a) stipulates that the duties (common external tariff) and other 
regulations of commerce imposed on trade of non-participants shall not on the whole be higher, 
or more restrictive, than the general incidence of duties and other trade regulations applicable in 
the participants prior to the formation of the customs union or adoption of the interim agreement. 
In other words the single tariff of a customs union and other trade barriers should not be higher 
than the pre-union average. Regional trade agreements must therefore not result in more severe 
barriers to trade for third member states of the WTO. In other words liberalization must not be 
achieved at the expense of others. This “conformity test” under Article XXIV: 5(a) is intended to 
ensure that customs unions or related interim arrangements perform their purpose of promoting 
trade among participants, while seeking to not unnecessarily raise trade barriers against non-
participants. In the Turkey – Textiles case, the Panel found that: 
‘What paragraph 5(a) provides, in short, is that the effects of the resulting trade 
measures and policies of the new regional agreement shall not be more trade restrictive, 
overall, than were the constituent countries' previous trade policies and that paragraph 
5(a) provided for an "economic" test  for assessing compatibility.’139   
Both these findings were shared by the Appellate Body, which added that “the text of the chapeau 
of paragraph 5 should be interpreted in its context”, and identified paragraph 4 as an import 
element in that context.  This led the Appellate Body to state: 
                                                          
138
 The East African Community membership is Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. 
139
 WT/DS34/R, para. 9.121. 
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‘According to paragraph 4, the purpose of a customs union is "to facilitate trade" between 
the constituent members and "not to raise barriers to the trade" with third countries. This 
objective demands that a balance be struck by the constituent members of a customs 
union.  A customs union should facilitate trade within the customs union, but it should not 
do so in a way that raises barriers to trade with third countries.’ 140 
An authentic free trade area (or interim agreement leading to the formation of a free trade area) 
will be accorded permission to operate in violation of the MFN principle provided that it 
promotes the trade of participants and does not raise barriers against trade with non-
participants.141 For services, the Economic integration agreement must also facilitate trade 
between the parties and thus ‘not raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services within the 
respective sectors or subsectors compared to the level applicable prior to such an 
arrangement’.142 
2.3.3. The period for implementation of an RTA. 
According to Article XXIV, an interim agreement for the establishment of a free-trade area 
should have “a plan and schedule” (an interim agreement) for the formation of the free-trade area 
“within a reasonable length of time”.143 Some clarity has been introduced by the Understanding 
on GATT Article XXIV over the ambiguity on what constitutes a "reasonable length of time".144 
                                                          
140
 WT/DS34/AB/R, paras. 55-56. 
141
 This condition is stipulated in GATT Article XXIV: 5(b) as follows: ‘the duties and other trade regulations in 
each of the FTA participants applied to trade with third countries at the formation of the free trade area or adoption 
of the interim agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other trade 
regulations existing in the same FTA participants prior to the formation of the free trade area or the interim 
agreement.’ 
142
  See Art.V:4 of GATS. 
143
 See GATT Article XXIV: 5(c) (emphasis added). 
144
  See Paragraph 3 on the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994. 
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The Understanding provides in part that the period should exceed 10 years only in exceptional 
circumstance.145  
2.3.4. Procedure for compensatory adjustment arising from the withdrawal or modification 
of schedules as set forth in GATT Article XXVIII and GATS Article XXI. 
If the adoption of a common external tariff by a WTO member of a custom union leads to an 
increase in its bound tariffs and thus becoming inconsistent with its previously negotiated 
schedules of tariff concessions as per GATT Article II,146 then the procedure for compensatory 
adjustment arising from the withdrawal or modification of schedules as set forth in GATT 
Article XXVIII (and the Understanding on that Article) applies.147 Paragraph 10 of the 1980 
Guidelines on “Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII”148 provides that these 
procedures are in relevant parts also valid for renegotiations under Article XXIV: 6.  The 1990 
Award by the Arbitrator on “Canada/European Communities - Article XXVIII Rights” discusses, 
inter alia, the Article XXVIII rights of Canada dating from Article XXIV: 6 negotiations Canada 
concluded with the Community on 29 March 1962 and the agreements on quality and ordinary 
wheat concluded between the parties on the same day.  The Award notes as follows: ‘it is generally 
accepted proposition that the right to withdraw concessions is an integral part of the right to 
negotiate.’149 
                                                          
145
 See Understanding Article XXIV: 5 (3) for more clarification. See also the discussion in various Working Party 
reports concerning “reasonable length of time:  EEC-Association of Greece, 11S/149, paras. 6, 7; EEC-Association 
with Turkey, 13S/59, paras. 6, 7, 19S/102, paras. 6, 8, 14, 21S/108, paras. 7, 10; UK-Ireland FTA, 14S/122, paras. 24, 
26. 
146
 GATT Article II provides in part that : 
‘Each contracting party shall  accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties treatment no less favourable 
than that provided for in the appropriate part of the appropriate schedule …’ 
147
 See Article XXIV:6 GATT and Paragraph 4 on the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. 
148
 See C/113 and Corr.1, 27S/26. 
149
 See DS12/R, 37S/80, 85. 
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Paragraph 4 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 on the 
other hand establishes the procedure to be followed when a Member forming a customs union 
proposes to increase a bound rate of duty.  The procedure provided in GATT Article XXVIII is 
compensatory adjustment. In essence, this procedure obliges participating custom unions to 
negotiate and agree with concerned WTO members, and further consult other WTO members 
with substantial interest in such concession, on adequate compensation.150 The Understanding on 
GATT notes that any compensatory negotiations be entered into in good faith and the failure to 
achieve any result within reasonable period of time entitles the customs union to modify or 
withdraw the concession made and for the other to retaliate. 151 For services, Article V: 5 of 
GATS provides that if a Member intends to withdraw or modify a specific commitment 
inconsistently with the terms and conditions set out in its schedule, the procedure for withdrawal 
and modification set forth in paragraphs 2,3 and 4 of Article XXI apply. The provision builds 
upon the tradition of Article XXIV: 6 and Article XXVIII GATT 1994 on modification of 
schedules.152 
2.4. WTO BASIC TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS ON RTAs. 
2.4.1. Notification. 
2.4.1.1.  Notification of agreements under Article XXIV.  
The time at which an RTA should be notified by Members is not precisely formulated nor 
homogeneously expressed in WTO rules. 153 In practice, many RTAs are notified when their 
texts have already been sealed or even when the RTA is already in force, and it has been argued 
that this restrains the effectiveness of the ensuing examination process.  It has been suggested 
that the terms “shall promptly notify” and “deciding to enter” in GATT Article XXIV: 7(a) 
should be interpreted to mean that the notification and submission of information should take 
                                                          
150
  See Article XXIV: 6 and article XXVIII paragraph 1 of the GATT 1947. 
151
 See Paragraph 5 on the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994. 
152
 See Article XXI: 2 Paragraph (a) of the GATS. 
153
  See “Compendium of Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements,” Negotiating Groups on Rules, World Trade 
Organization, August 1, 2002, TN/RL/W/8/Rev. 1(02-4246). 
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place, at least, before the entry into force of the RTA.  Conversely, it has been observed that a 
case-by-case approach is more appropriate to take into account the complexity of issues 
surrounding RTAs, in particular the political and legal difficulties related to notifying an RTA 
prior to its ratification. The Council Decision of 25 October 1972 on procedures for the 
examination of customs unions and free-trade areas provides that: 
‘The Council notes that Article XXIV:7(a) of the General Agreement requires that any 
contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free trade area or an interim 
agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES.’154 
2.4.2. Procedures for examination of agreements under Article XXIV. 
The examination of agreements under Article XXIV has been conducted in working parties 
established for that purpose; such working parties have generally commenced with an exchange of 
written questions and answers concerning the agreement under examination.155 The Report in 1949 
of the Working Party on “The South Africa-Southern Rhodesia Customs Union”, which was the 
first Working Party ever to examine an agreement under Article XXIV, notes that the integration 
agreement should be examined on a case by case basis since the use of precedents was clearly 
against the spirit of Article XXIV.156 The Report of the Working Party on “EEC - Agreement of 
Association with Turkey” records the view that “as acknowledged by prior working parties, these 
association agreements had to be considered on a case-by-case basis and in their own context”.157 
Paragraph 7 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 
provides that: 
‘All notifications made under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV shall be examined by a 
working party in the light of the relevant provisions of GATT 1994 and of paragraph 1 of 
                                                          
154
  See 19S/13. 
155
 See the Analytical Index of the GATT p 817. 
156
  See GATT/CP.3/SR.13, p. 5, 7.  
157
  See L/3750, adopted on 25 October 1972, 19S/102, 103, para. 3. 
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this Understanding.  The working party shall submit a report to the Council for Trade in 
Goods on its findings in this regard. The Council for Trade in Goods may make such 
recommendations to Members as it deems appropriate”. 
Past GATT practice,158 and one which is likely to continue under the WTO, shows that interim 
agreements are notified only after they have been agreed to and ratified by the participants, 
leaving no room for further changes. A further obligation is stipulated by GATT Article XXIV: 
7(c) to the effect that parties to an interim agreement shall communicate any substantial change 
in the plan or schedule to WTO members who may request consultations with the participants if 
the change seems likely to jeopardize or unduly delay the formation of the customs union or free 
trade area.  
2.4.3. Periodic reporting. 
At the end of the Twenty-seventh Session in 1971, the CONTRACTING PARTIES instructed the 
Council to establish a calendar fixing dates for the examination, every two years, of reports on 
regional preferential agreements.159 However, no such calendar has been fixed since 1987. At the 
Twenty-Fifth Session in 1968, the representative of the EEC stated that since 1 July 1968 the 
customs union had been fully achieved, and the Community did not anticipate submitting further 
reports on the formation of the customs union.160  At the February 1970 Council meeting, the EEC 
cited its notification that on 1 January 1970 the Common Market had completed its transitional 
period of existence and entered the definitive stage, and “this Customs Union is now complete in 
accordance with the criteria laid down in Article XXIV”161  and stated that the Community would 
                                                          
158
 Compendium of Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements, Negotiating Groups on Rules, World Trade 
Organization, August 1, 2002, TN/RL/W/8/Rev. 1(02-4246). 
159
 See L/3641, 18S/37, 38.  For calendars established by the Council, see, e.g., documents L/3682/Rev.1, L/4100, 
L/4445, L/4725, L/5158, L/5502 and L/5825.See also material on this subject in various reports of working parties:  
ANZCERT, 31S/170, paras. 26, 28, 31; Australia-Papua New Guinea, 24S/63, paras. 14, 15, 19 and Canada-US FTA, 
38S/47. 
160
 See L/3125, SR.25/7 p. 119ff, SR.25/9 p. 171ff; also see later statement by the EEC that from a legal point of view, 
there was no reporting obligation in the case of customs unions and free-trade areas which had been fully completed, 
C/M/123, p. 6.  
161
 See L/3332. 
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no longer submit annual reports on the development of its customs union.  The Chairman in his 
summary noted that he had consulted on this matter with delegations and had come to the 
conclusion that it would be wiser not to pursue an examination of the legal issues involved; he 
noted as well that: 
‘such a decision was without prejudice to the legal rights of all contracting parties under 
Article XXIV, so that it was open to any contracting party to raise on the agenda of the 
Council or on the agenda of the CONTRACTING PARTIES any specific matter arising under 
Article XXIV in relation to the Community’.162  
The Report of the Working Party on “Australia/New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement (ANZCERT)”  also records the view of the representative of Australia that  “consistent 
with past GATT practice, the parties would be prepared to submit a report biennially to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES on the operation of the Agreement.  They would, however, see no need to 
continue this reporting once the full free trade area had been finally established”.163   
Paragraph 11 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 
provides that ‘Customs unions and constituents of free-trade areas shall report periodically to the 
Council for Trade in Goods, as envisaged by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 in their 
instruction to the GATT 1947 Council concerning reports on regional agreements (BISD 18S/38), 
on the operation of the relevant agreement.  Any significant changes and/or developments in the 
agreements should be reported as they occur’.   
2.4.4.  Recommendation by the Contracting Parties. 
Recommendation by the Contracting Parties is also relevant. It was stated during the discussions 
on the General Agreement at the Geneva session of the Preparatory Committee that: 
‘Where a country   Member of the Agreement enters into an arrangement with another 
country  which involves preferential arrangements which are not consistent with its 
obligations under the MFN and justifies that departure from its obligations on the ground 
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  See C/M/61, p. 6-7. 
163
 See L/5664, adopted on 2 October 1984, 31S/170, 179, para. 28. 
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that it is a step toward a Customs Union, then the contracting parties should have a chance 
to have a look at those proposals and see whether they are in fact as represented.’ 164 
The Report of the Working Party on “EEC - Agreement with Spain” on the other hand contains the 
following paragraph:  
“Members of the Working Party noted that paragraph 7(b) stipulated that the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES should make recommendations to the parties to a free-trade 
agreement if they found that the Agreement was not likely to result in the formation of a 
customs union or a free-trade area within the period contemplated by the parties to the 
Agreement or the period foreseen for the formation of free-trade area was not a reasonable 
one.”
165
 
Paragraphs 7 through 10 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 
1994 conclude by providing as follows: 
  “... The Council for Trade in Goods may make such recommendations to Members as it 
deems appropriate In regard to interim agreements, the working party may in its report 
make appropriate recommendations on the proposed time-frame and on measures required 
to complete the formation of the customs union or free-trade area.  It may if necessary 
provide for further review of the agreement.” 
2.5.  Notification, examination and periodic reporting of agreements under Article V of GATS. 
2.5.1. “Members which are parties to any agreement ... shall promptly notify any such 
agreement” 
In addition to the substantive legal requirements introduced by the GATS with regard to sectoral 
coverage and the prohibition on raising the level of barriers to the third parties and members of 
the regional group, Art. V sets out notification requirements for EIA.  GATS Article V: 7(a) 
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 See EPCT/TAC/PV/11, p. 37. 
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 See L/3579, adopted on 6 October 1971, 18S/166, 172, para. 21. 
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requires the parties to an RTA to promptly notify any such agreement and any enlargement or 
any significant modification of that agreement to the Council for Trade in Services. The time at 
which such notification should be made by Members is however not expressly stated in the 
Agreement and the practice under Article XXIV GATT may provide some guidance on the issue. 
However, as noted earlier, many RTAs are notified when their texts have already been sealed or 
even when the RTA is already in force. This has been argued 166 to restrain the effectiveness of 
the ensuing examination process.  It has been suggested however,167 that the term “shall 
promptly notify” in GATS Article V: 7(a) should be interpreted to mean that the notification and 
submission of information should take place, at least, before the entry into force of the RTA. On 
the examination of the agreement, Article V: 7 (a) provides that: 
“The Council may establish a working party to examine such an agreement or enlargement or 
modification of that agreement and to report to the Council on its consistency with the Article.” 
GATS Article V: 7(b) on the other hand requires the parties to an RTA implemented on the basis 
of a time-frame to “report periodically” to the Council for Trade in Services (CTS) on its 
implementation.  In that context, it has been proposed that periodic reporting should be extended 
to all economic integration agreements (EIAs), whether or not implemented in stages. Finally, it 
has been noted that this would require a renegotiation of GATS provisions. 
2.5.2. RTA Consistency Assessment.  
The requirement for a multilateral consistency assessment of certain notified RTAs is contained 
in the provisions themselves, sometimes explicitly, as in GATS Article 7(a), sometimes 
implicitly, as in paragraph 7 of the Understanding.168 The meaning of "consistency" is also 
defined in paragraph 1 of the 1994 Understanding with respect to RTAs notified under Article 
XXIV. It has been argued that an RTA can be considered as tolerated or deemed compatible by 
                                                          
166
 See Compendium of Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements, Negotiating Groups on Rules, World Trade 
Organization, August 1, 2002, TN/RL/W/8/Rev. 1(02-4246)50. 
167
 See  Compendium of Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements, Negotiating Groups on Rules, World Trade 
Organization, August 1, 2002, TN/RL/W/8/Rev. 1(02-4246)52. 
168
 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 (hereinafter, the 1994 Understanding). 
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the WTO in the absence of clear consistency conclusions being spelled out in the report on its 
examination, or when no such examination report exists.169 Conversely, it has been argued that 
the legal status of RTAs in the WTO can also be considered as remaining unclear, the rights of 
WTO Members under dispute settlement procedures being preserved in any event. In the dispute 
Turkey –Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (hereinafter Turkey – Textiles) 
case, the Panel examined an argument put forward and agreed with the findings of the GATT 
Panel in EEC - Imports from Hong Kong, which had rejected a similar argument put forward by 
the European Communities (EC), stating that ‘ it would be erroneous to interpret the fact that a 
measure had not been subject to Article XXIII over a number of years, as tantamount to its tacit 
acceptance by contracting parties.’ 170 While WTO rules provide for a multilateral assessment of 
the consistency of an RTA with the rules, the possibility of recourse to dispute settlement is 
explicitly referred to in paragraph 12 of the Understanding. On the question of a panel's 
jurisdiction to assess the compatibility of RTAs, the Appellate Body, in the Turkey – Textiles 
case, stated 
‘We would expect a panel, when examining such a measure [taken by a party to a 
customs union], to require a party to establish that both of these conditions [the customs 
union fully meets the requirements of XXIV: 8(a) and 5(a) and that without such measure 
that customs union could not be formed] have been fulfilled.’171  
2.6. WTO NEW TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM FOR REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS.172 
Instead of awaiting the final results of the Doha Development Round negotiations, the WTO 
General Council formally established the transparency mechanism on 14 December 2006.173 This 
                                                          
169
 The examination, which is a multilateral function (i.e. by the WTO Membership), should in principle include an 
assessment of the consistency of the examined RTA vis-à-vis relevant WTO rules. 
170
 Panel Report on EEC – Quantitative Restrictions against Imports of certain Products from Hong Kong, adopted 
on 12 July 1983 (BISD 30S/129), para. 28 and Panel Report on Turkey- Textiles, adopted on 19 November 1999 
(WT/DS34/R), paras. 9.172-174. 
171
 Appellate Body Report, adopted on 19 November 1999 (WT/DS34/AB/R), paras. 59-60. 
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 Hereinafter abbreviated as RTAs. 
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showed the urgency felt by the WTO members for more transparency in the creation and 
functioning of the RTAs.The mechanism was to operate on a provisional basis.174 The new 
“RTAs’ Transparency Process” provides for: 
1. Early announcement of Regional Trade Agreements. 
Provision of information of RTAs under negotiation and signed i.e. name, scope and date of 
signature, timetable for entry into force of the agreement, etc. Such information would be posted 
on the WTO website and be periodically updated by the Secretariat.175 
2. Notification. 
Notification of the RTA should be as early as possible – after ratification or application of the 
agreement by a party but before the application of preferential treatment.176 In notifying their 
RTA, the parties should specify under which provision(s) of the WTO agreements it is notified.  
They will also provide the full text of the RTA (or those parts they have decided to apply) and 
any related schedules, annexes and protocols, in one of the WTO official languages.177 Where 
available this preliminary information is to be submitted in an electronically exploitable form.178 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
173
 After tortuous negotiations, agreement reached on text on 14 December 2006 (WT/L/671 and 672; 18 December 
2006). 
174
 See paragraph 7 of the Preamble to  Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of 14 
December 2006  and paragraph 22  which provides that: 
“This Decision shall apply, on a provisional basis, to all RTAs.” 
175
 See Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of 14 
December 2006. 
176
  See Paragraph 3 of the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of 14 December 
2006. 
177
 See Paragraph 4 of the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of 14 December 
2006. 
178See Paragraph 4 of the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of 14 December 2006. 
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3. Factual Presentation of RTAs. 
The WTO Secretariat, on its own responsibility and in full consultation with the parties, shall 
prepare a factual presentation of the RTA. This “Factual Presentation” is to assist Members in 
their consideration of the RTA.179 The Factual Presentation by the Secretariat is based on 
information and data provided by the parties.  Other sources of information could be used by the 
Secretariat but opportunity should be given to the parties to comment on their accuracy.180 
4. Subsequent notification and reporting. 
Any changes or modification to the regional trade agreement should be notified as soon as 
possible.181  The parties are required to  provide a summary of the changes made, as well as any 
related texts, schedules, annexes and protocols, in one of the WTO official languages and, if 
available, in electronically exploitable format.182 At the end of the RTA's implementation period, 
the parties shall submit to the WTO a short written report on the realization of the liberalization 
commitments in the RTA as originally notified.183 
2.7. CONCLUSION. 
Regional trade agreements are bound to be an exception to the MFN treatment principle.WTO 
rules both allow and contain regional trade through setting conditions for the formation of RTAs 
within the multilateral trade system. The current WTO rules on regional trade are weak and 
ambiguous.184  Further the long-term misunderstanding on the interpretation of some phrases 
                                                          
179
  See Paragraph 7(b) of the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of 14 December 
2006. 
180
 See Paragraph 9 of the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of 14 December 
2006. 
181
 See Paragraph 14 of the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of 14 December 
2006. 
182
 In their notification, Members may refer to official Internet links related to the agreement where the relevant 
information can be consulted in full, in one of the WTO official languages. 
183
 See Paragraph 15 of the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of 14 December 
2006. 
184
 See Chapter 4 for recommendation for change. 
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especially ‘substantially all’ hamper regionalism and trade liberalisation. It is difficult to 
determine whether all the requirements for regionalism have been meet since WTO members 
have taken different interpretation of the vital phrases.For,example the phrase ‘substantially all ’ 
has both the qualitative and quantitative interpretation. The notification procedure is also weak. 
Article XXIV, paragraph 7(a) GATT requires any member entering into a regional trade 
agreement to ‘promptly notify’ the WTO.The problem with this notification requirement is that it 
is unclear as to when any country should make such notification. Is it before any regional trade 
agreement is in force or after? The new Transparency Mechanism which is an essential 
component for the restoration of the WTO’s supervisory role on the trade policies pursued by 
RTAs is not free from fault. 185  This realisation formed the basis for negotiation at the Doha 
Round of negotiations discussed latter in this thesis. 186 
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
185
 See Chapter 4 for recommendation for change especially Ecuador Proposal for change of the Transparency 
mechanism. 
 
186
  See Chapter 4 for recommendation for change. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3.0 THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE. 
3.1. Introduction. 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) constitute an increasingly significant feature of the world 
trade system. Africa and East Africa in particular is not an exception to this phenomenon.187 The 
East African Community (EAC) is an example of such RTAs in the world now recognized “to 
play an important role in promoting the liberalization and expansion of trade and in fostering 
development.” 188 Using key principles and provisions of the East African Community Treaty, 
East African Customs Union Protocol and Common Market Protocol as yardsticks for analysis, 
this chapter shows how RTAs complements the multilateral trading system. The key objective of 
the RTAs has been further trade liberalisation,189 through elimination of tariff, non-tariff and 
technical barriers to trade.190 Regional integration and cooperation in the East Africa Region 
(EAR) has been a subject of discussion for a long period of time. The East African Community, 
for example, evolved from an earlier common customs collection centre that was established in 
1900 during the construction of the Kenya/Uganda Railway between 1897 and 1901.191 Later in 
1919, a Customs union was established, then the East Africa Income Tax Board and the Joint 
Economic Council both in 1940. In June 1967, the three East Africa State Partners signed the 
Treaty of East African Economic Cooperation that established the East Africa Community. The 
Treaty outlined the objective of East Africa Community as: 
 ‘... to strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial and other relations of the partner 
states expansion of economic activities the benefit whereof shall be equitably shared.’ 
However, because of perceived inequality in the benefit distribution, ideological differences, 
differences in levels of development and lack of political will to solve real and imagined 
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problems, the community collapsed in 1977.192 Efforts to revive cooperation later began after the 
signing of the Agreement for the establishment of a permanent Tripartite Commission in 
Kampala on 26th November 1994.193 Negotiations for the re-establishment of the EAC began, 
leading to the signing of the Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community on 30th 
November 1999.194 The Treaty came into force on 30th July 2000 ushering in a new era for 
cooperation in economic, social and political affairs to the people of East Africa.195  The coming 
into force of the Common Market Protocol in 2010 ushered in extensive trade liberalization in 
East Africa region. This implied total elimination of barriers to trade in goods and services, 
accompanied by free movement of capital, persons and the right of establishment in the Common 
Market.196 Harmonization and coordination of monetary and fiscal policies is also an essential 
requirement in the integration process. 197 
3.2. The EAC Common Market Protocol. 
3.2.0. Elements of the Common Market Protocol. 
The East Africa Community Common Market Protocol establishes a framework within which the 
parties can cooperate with a view of realising accelerated economic growth and development 
through the attainment of free movement of goods, persons, labour, the right of establishment 
and residence, the free movement of services and capital.198 This section of the research 
demonstrates how the EAC has further liberalized trade in goods and services to the benefit of its 
member states. 
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3.2.1. Liberalizing trade in services. 
Trade in services is an important component of the EAC Partner States economies.199 On 
average, the service sector presently accounts for about 48.8 percent of GDP and 34.5 percent 
cent share of total exports in the EAC region despite the existence of various trade barriers.200 
Liberalisation of service trade in the region depicts a change in attitude by the governments to 
gradually expose previous monopoly domains to competition.201 Multilaterally, the creation of 
GATS as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations provide a basis for progressive 
liberalisation as a means of promoting the economic growth of all trading partners.202 
Regionally, the EAC Treaty in its article 76 on the establishment of a common market 
recommends a free movement of trade in services.203 The Common Market Protocol has 
integrated this provision and defined the framework for liberalising trade in services in the 
EAC.204 Trade in services is defined by GATS as the supply of services through four (4) modes 
of supply.205 A similar approach is followed by the protocol in its definition of service trade 
which is four-pronged, depending on the territorial presence of the supplier and the consumer at 
the time of the transaction. Pursuant to Article 16:2, the Protocol covers services supplied  
(a) from the territory of a Partner State into the territory of another Partner State;206 
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(b) in the territory of a Partner State to service consumers from another Partner State 
commonly referred to as Mode 2-Consumption abroad in GATS-speak; 
(c) by a service supplier of a Partner State ,through commercial presence of the service 
supplier in the territory of another Partner State also known as Mode 3-Commercial 
presence; and 
(d) by the presence of a service supplier, who is a citizen of a Partner State ,in the territory of 
another Partner State also referred to as Mode 4-Presence of natural persons. 
Article 16:3 stipulates that the Partner States shall take such measures to ensure the observance 
of the measures by local government and local authorities and non-governmental bodies within 
the Partner States. It does not matter in this context whether a measure is taken at national or 
local government level, or by non-governmental bodies exercising delegated powers.207 The 
relevant definition covers any measure taken by Partner States as ‘laws and administrative 
actions.’208 Excluded from coverage are ‘services provided in the exercise of governmental 
authority” which, in turn, are defined as services that are supplied “neither on a commercial 
basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers.’209 Services normally provided for 
remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to free movement of 
goods, capital and persons are nevertheless included in the coverage.210 The principles 
underlying services trade regulation under the protocol is similar to that of GATS. For example, 
the National treatment obligation provided for by Article 17 of the Protocol implies the absence 
of all discriminatory measures that modify the conditions of competition to the detriment of 
foreign services or service suppliers. This obligation applies regardless of whether or not foreign 
services and suppliers are treated in a formally identical way to their national counterpart. What 
matters is that they are granted equal opportunities to compete. The Article provides that: 
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‘Each Partner State shall accord to services and service suppliers of other Partner States, 
treatment not less favourable than that accorded to similar services and services suppliers of the 
Partner State.’211 
The accorded treatment shall either be ‘formally identical’ or ‘formally different’, but it must not 
be less favourable.212 A treatment is less favourable ‘... if it modifies the conditions of 
competition in favour of services or services suppliers of the Partner State compared to like 
services or service suppliers of the other Partner State.213  
For purposes of clarity, the term ‘less favourable treatment’ has been further clarified in the 
WTO case Canada –Autos214, where it was emphasized that a treatment is less favourable only if 
it modifies the conditions of competition against service and service suppliers who are already 
disadvantaged due to their foreign character. On the other hand, Article 18 of the Common 
Market Protocol sets out the principle of Most Favoured Nation treatment for trade in services. 
The article provides that: 
‘Each Partner State...shall accord unconditionally, to services and service suppliers of other 
Partner state, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service 
suppliers of other Partner States or any third party or a customs territory’ 
Similar provisions exist for the MFN Clause in GATS Article II: 1 which applies to all services. 
The MFN principle in GATS however contains one unique feature. Article II: 2 of the GATS 
permits members to maintain a measure inconsistent with the principle provided that such a 
measure is listed in, and meets the conditions of the Annex on Article II Exemptions which  
relieves a Member only from its obligation under paragraph 1 of Article II, according to which it 
is required to extend the most favourable treatment it accords to any country to all other 
Members of the GATS.These exemption however, does not relieve a Member from its 
obligations or commitment under any other provision of the GATS.215 Therefore if a Member 
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takes an MFN exemption in a sector where specific commitments are undertaken, the exemption 
would allow that member to deviate from its obligations under paragraph 1 of Article II but not 
from its commitments under Articles XVI or XVII. Notification obligations are also necessary in 
trade service, Art.19 of the Protocol sets out notification requirements for all measures of general 
application affecting the free movement of services. The notification requirement in Article 19:1 
of the Protocol differs from those contained in GATS in the sense that the notification has to be 
made to the Council of Ministers of the Community established by Article 9 of the EAC Treaty 
instead of the Council on Trade in Services. The relevant parts of the Protocol containing 
specific notification requirements are the following: 
 Article 19 (paragraph 1)-Notification. 
‘Each Partner State shall promptly notify the Council of all the measures of general application 
affecting the free movement of services at the entry into force of this Protocol.’ 
 Article 19 (paragraph 2)-Notification. 
‘The Partner State shall notify the Council of any international agreements pertaining to or 
affecting trade in services with third parties that they are signatory to, prior to and after the 
entry into force of this Protocol.’ 
 Article 19 (paragraph 4)-Notification. 
‘Each Partner State shall, promptly and at least annually, inform the Council of the introduction 
of any new national laws or administrative guidelines, or any changes to existing laws or 
administrative guidelines which affect trade in services provided for in this Protocol.’ 
The Protocol explicitly recognizes the continued right (and, possibly the need) of Partners States 
to enforce domestic policy objectives through regulation. Pursuant to Article 20:2, measures of 
general application are to be administered “in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner”, 
phrases borrowed from GATS Article VI: 1.The measures must also not constitute barriers to 
trade in services. However, harmonisation of various domestic regulations is pertinent in the 
realisation of the established standards in the region.  
Article 21 of the Protocol provides for the general exceptions to trade in services. Partner States 
are allowed to restrict trade in service to protect public morals or to maintain public order. They 
may also restrict trade to protect human, animal or plant life or health.216 The necessity test 
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approach of GATT article XX is also a qualification for the adoption of restrictive measures 
under Article 21 of the protocol.217 The measures adopted must be necessary to achieve the 
stated objectives i.e. not arbitrary and or a disguised restriction to trade.218  
Finally the service trade liberalisation in the region is progressive. Partner States have Schedule 
of commitment which resembles those of GATS. The schedule of commitments which is 
contained in Annex V of the Protocol outlines limitation on the number of service sector 
liberalised, the time frame for liberalisation and the modes of service supply that are being 
liberalised. Only 7 out of a total of 12 service sector have been included in the Protocol. The 
sector include business service, communication service, distribution service, education service, 
financial service, transport service and travel and tourism service. Within these sectors specific 
subsectors have been liberalised according to each partner states preference. Liberalisation time 
frame runs from 2010-2015.219 Trade in professional services through the movement of natural 
persons is restricted by explicit trade barriers, regulatory requirements and immigration policies. 
These can only be remedied by mutual recognition initiatives, development of common 
standards, revisiting visa and immigration laws and finally regional cooperation to improve 
professional education in EAR. 
3.2.2. Cooperation in intellectual property rights. 
Cooperation in intellectual property rights (IPRs) is another major provision of the Protocol. 
Article 43 of the Protocol provides the framework for this cooperation which involves inter alia 
the adoption of common positions in regional and international norm setting.220 Development of 
legal protective mechanism in IPRs is also important .Virtually all the EAC Partner States have 
institutional and legal frameworks for the protection and enforcement of main aspects of 
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intellectual property especially patents, trademarks and copyright.221 The cooperation aims at 
promoting and protecting creativity and innovation for economic, technological, social and 
cultural development in the community. It further enhances the protection of intellectual property 
rights.222 In the Doha negotiations the members inter alia stressed the importance attached to the 
implementation and interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in a manner supportive of public health.223 The East Africa 
Partner States have moved to implement this through the Draft EAC Regional Intellectual 
Property Policy and Protocol on the Utilisation of Public Health Related WTO-TRIPS 
Flexibilities.224 Finally it is worth to note that the Protocol has also incorporated intellectual 
property rights provisions that largely mirror the substantive obligations of the TRIPS 
Agreement.225 
3.2.3. Liberalizing trade in goods. 
Trade liberalization principally involves the elimination of tariffs by members against each other.  
Within RTAs, tariffs are close to zero except for a few sensitive products. Overall there is no 
evidence that high tariff rates are currently a major impediment to intra-African trade.226 
Reducing these barriers for goods is relatively straightforward _taxes and tariffs at the borders 
are removed so that goods can move around at no additional cost. The World Trade Organisation 
Chief during his visit to Kenya on 30th March 2011 noted that the review of customs regulations 
and harmonisation of standards in the EAC region were the precondition for moving 
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internationally. Kenya was urged to spearhead the removal of trade barriers within East African 
Community to increase its regional business.227 The Customs union Protocol and the Common 
Market Protocol provides a framework for the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade.  The Preamble to the Protocol on the establishment of the East Africa Customs union at 
paragraph 6 provides that:  
‘...Partner States are desirous to deepen and strengthen trade among themselves and are 
resolved to abolish tariff and non-tariff barriers to create the most favourable environment for 
the development of regional trade.’ 
Article 2.4 of the Customs Union Protocol further provides that: 
‘Within the Customs Union 
(a) Customs duties and other charges of equivalent effect imposed on imports shall be 
eliminated save as provided for in this protocol. 
(b) Non-tariff barriers to trade among the Partner States shall be removed.’ 
Liberalising trade in goods under this circumstance involves the substantial reduction of tariff 
and elimination of NTBs within the Community.  
a) Substantial reduction of Tariffs. 
The Customs Union objectives in article 3 of the CU Protocol were inter alia to further liberalise 
intra-regional trade in goods on the basis of mutually beneficial trade arrangements among the 
Partner States.228 These requires the Partner States to cooperate in matters concerning trade 
liberalisation and trade related aspects including the simplification and harmonisation of trade 
documentation, customs regulation and procedures with particular reference to such matters such 
as the valuation of goods, tariff classification, collection of customs duties, cross-border trade 
and export drawbacks.229 Intra-EAC tariff liberalisation started when the Customs Union 
Protocol was implemented on 1st January 2005.Kenya was required to eliminate its tariff on 
imports originating in Tanzania and Uganda respectively, with immediate effect on day 1 of the 
Customs Union Protocol implementation.Tanzania’s and Uganda’s trade in category A products 
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was also liberalised; tariffs on both countries category B imports originating in Kenya were to be 
phased out gradually over a period of 5 years starting on 1st January 2005.230 A three-band 
Common External Tariff (CET) on EAC imports originating in third countries (countries outside 
the EAC Common Customs territory) was also agreed upon in the context of EAC Customs 
Union Protocol.231 Further, Article 37(2) of the Common market Protocol provides inter alia that 
the Partner States shall adopt common principles in particular in relation to tariff rates and 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements. 
b) Elimination of non-barriers barriers (NTBs). 
Several recent studies on NTBs, particularly in the context of the COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Tripartite Summit Task Force highlighted the following NTBs _ cumbersome customs and 
administrative entry procedures cause border delays and increased costs with a view to removing 
them through elimination or cooperative measures. The EAC region is characterised by lengthy 
clearance processes, lengthy classification and valuation of import processes, arbitrary 
documentation requirements and difficulties related to transit traffic (cumbersome and non-
standardised procedures, cumbersome procedures for verifying containerised imports and 
diversion of transit goods into the region). Partner States have therefore committed themselves to 
eliminate ‘with immediate effect ’all existing NTBs on intra-EAC trade and to refrain from 
introducing new NTBs.232 NTBs results from deliberate policies and procedures by states which 
need to be eliminated in order to liberalise trade. Article 1 of the Customs Union Protocol 
defines non-tariff barriers as laws, regulations, administrative and technical requirements other 
than tariffs imposed by a particular state whose effect is to impede trade.  
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3.2.4. Free Movement of Capital. 
Article 24 provides that the Partner State will remove restrictions on capital movement for East 
Africa resident or nationals not impose any new restrictions on payments related to capital 
movement or current payment and remove restrictions on capital incidental to the movement. 
However, the partner states can restrict capital movement on the ground that the restriction is 
appropriate, reasonable and justified. For example where the free movement of capital creates 
‘disturbance in the functioning of the financial market or causes a balance of payment 
difficulties,’ then a partner state can impose safeguard measures.233 These safeguard measures are 
subject to strict rules about their scope and manner of imposition.234 Safeguards are useful values 
that allow governments to suspend totally or partially their obligations-on a temporary and non-
discriminatory basis in relation to injury caused to a domestic industry  as a consequence of 
unforeseen situation that stem from the implementation  of trade liberalization obligations.  
3.2.5 Other Areas of Cooperation in the Common Market. 
Article 29 provides that Partner States will protect cross-border investment of other Partner 
States and the fruits of those investments. This involves ensuring protection and security of 
cross-border investment, national treatment, and MFN treatment for those investors, and 
compensation on expropriation. 235 Articles 33-36 provides rules on trade related issues; mainly 
competition, public procurement and subsidies. The rules on competition prevent any business 
practices which adversely affect free trade. Article 33 of the Protocol regionalizes the 
competition rules, an approach different from other RTAs which have competition rules on the 
main treaty.236 Partner States are also prohibited from granting subsidies which distorts or 
threatens to distort effective competition by favouring an undertaking.237 Public procurement is 
subject to strict discipline as partner states are prohibited from discriminating against suppliers, 
products and services originating from other Partner States. 
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3.2.6. Anti-dumping measures. 
Although the CU Protocol define the phrase “anti-dumping measure” in its provision, the 
Appellate Body in US-1916 Act opted for a wider definition of the phrase by rejecting the 
argument that based on the history of Article 1 of ADA238, “the phrase ‘anti-dumping measure’ 
refers only to definitive anti-dumping duties, price undertakings and provisional measures.” The 
Appellate Body stated that  
‘the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘anti-dumping measure’ seems to encompass all 
measures taken against dumping. We do not see in the words ‘an anti-dumping measure’ 
any explicit limitation to particular types of measures.’239 
Dumping is prohibited if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in any 
Partner States, materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry therein or frustrates the 
benefits expected from the removal or absence of duties and quantitative restrictions of trade 
between Partner States.240 The anti-dumping laws provide relief to domestic industries that have 
been, or are threatened with, the adverse impacts of imports sold in the EAC market at prices that 
are shown to be less than fair market value. The scope and manner of imposition of the anti-
dumping measures are captured by the East African Community Customs Union (Anti-dumping 
Measures) Regulations specified in Annex IV to the CU protocol. Under Article 16(2) of the CU 
protocol the EAC secretariat is required to notify the WTO on anti-dumping measures taken by 
any Partner State. 
3.2.7. Countervailing measures. 
Article 18 of the CU Protocol provides that the community may for the purposes of offsetting the 
effects of subsidies and subject to the East Africa Community Customs Union (Subsidies and 
Countervailing measures) Regulations specified in Annex V to the Protocol levy a countervailing 
duty on any product of any foreign country imported into the Customs union. The Countervailing 
duty shall be equal to the amount of the estimated subsidy determined to have been granted 
directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production or export of that product in the country of 
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origin or exportation.241 Under Article 20 of CU Protocol the Partner States shall cooperate in the 
detection and investigation of dumping, subsidies and sudden surge in imports and in imposition 
of agreed measures to curb such practices. 
3.3. Conclusion.  
Liberalising trade for both goods and services is the main objective of the multilateral trade 
system. Regionalism borrows this objective and provides simple rules for further trade 
liberalisation. Principles associated with the multilateral trade system such as the most –favoured 
nation treatment and national treatment also form the basis for trade liberalisation within the 
EAC regional trade system. The EAC Partner States have been working hard to overcome 
various challenges that emanate from the multilateral trade system with the view to improving 
business climate as well as the economic infrastructure within the region through the 
simplification of rules and procedure for trade. This chapter analysed important provisions of the 
East Africa Community Treaty, Customs Union Protocol and the Common Market Protocol 
which complements most WTO-Agreement obligations especially those of GATT, GATS, and 
TRIPS.  The Preamble to the Protocol on the establishment of the East Africa Customs union at 
paragraph 8 provides that:  
‘The Partner States are CONSCIOUS of their obligations, as Contracting Parties to the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, 1994(the WTO 
Agreement)....’ (emphasis added). 
On the other hand paragraph 3 to the WTO Agreement states that: 
‘WTO members are desirous of contributing to their objectives by entering into 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangement directed to the substantial reduction 
of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international trade relations.’(emphasis added). 
One can comfortably conclude from the above provisions that both the WTO and the East Africa 
Community aim at liberalising trade by eliminating tariffs and NTBs to trade making them 
complimentary to each other. In other words regionalism and multilateralism are complimentary. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.0. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS. 
4.1. Introduction. 
Although the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in force globally, has been increasing 
yearly, the debate over whether RTAs contribute to or weaken and damage the multilateral 
system still remains.242 It is clear from the topics covered that the RTAs of whatever depth 
cannot be said to be good or bad unequivocally for individual members. Further, the analysis of 
trade creation and trade diversion suggest a cautious assessment of any RTA. Several factors 
underlie the proliferation of RTAs in the world trade today. Among these factors, is the stalling 
of the multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO which has resulted in an increasing focus on 
regionalism and RTAs.243 RTAs are in general perceived to be either stumbling blocks or 
building blocks for further global trade liberalisation.244 They may reduce welfare when trade 
diversion is greater than trade creation.245 The current regionalism trend poses some challenges 
to the multilateral trade system since almost all of WTO member-states are now part of that 
trend. 246 Most of them have generally emphasized that their meticulously bilateral agreements 
reinforce the WTO system rather than undermine it.247 GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V 
and the Enabling Clause sets the multilateral constitutional limits within which RTAs operate. 
However these rules have proved to be inadequate and to cause confusion to the members 
especially in the interpretation of some phrases. In the Doha Round of negotiations the WTO-
members agreed to ‘negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures 
under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements.’248 
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The negotiations were to take into account the developmental aspects of regional trade 
agreements. This chapter analyses inter alia the various review proposals so far submitted by 
WTO member states within the Doha Ministerial Declaration. 
4.2. Deficiency in the WTO’s legal framework for managing RTAs. 
One of the current stumbling blocks to the WTO’s effectiveness in dealing with RTAs is the lack 
of agreement on the interpretation of the substantive WTO criteria for regionalism. Article 
XXIV, paragraph 5, stipulates that RTA members must not increase the overall level of trade 
barriers towards non-members after the agreement is concluded.249 The article in essence is 
designed to limit a RTA’s trade barriers towards non-members. The major issue that emanate 
from this provision is how the WTO judge whether a RTA meet the requirement of ‘not 
increasing the overall level of trade barriers’ to levels higher than the levels prior to the 
agreement’s formation. Article XXIV: 5 is completely silent in defining this phrase. This has 
made it difficult, if not impossible for RTAs parties and the WTO itself to determine if this 
requirement has been met.250 Article XXIV: 5 was an attempt to restrict a RTA’s introduction of 
trade-diverting measures but opposite results seem to have occurred. The opinion derived from 
this is that article XXIV:5 has actually become the legal framework  justifying, -rather than 
limiting ,such measures. Given this, along with the fact that it is unresolved within the 
multilateral trading system, it is not surprising that article according to Edwini Kessie, a 
counsellor in the WTO’s Council, is ‘one of the most controversial provisions of the GATT.’251 
The idea behind regionalism was to ensure that countries go ‘all the way’ in their regional trade 
liberalisation. The GATT framers thought that RTAs were vehicles for further trade 
liberalisation rather than discriminatory platform. Article XXIV:8 GATT  requires the 
elimination of trade barriers with respect to‘substantially all trade’ between RTA countries. The 
problem with Article XXIV: 8 is that there has never been any agreement on how much trade 
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 GATT Article XXIV:5 (a) and (b). 
 
250
 Kessie, E Counselor, Council& Trade Negotiations Committee, World Trade Organisation ‘WTO Rules Relating 
to Regional Trade Agreement,’ power point presentation for Trade Policy Issues Workshop, Asian Development 
Bank, Singapore, Malaysia 25 February 2002:13. 
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  Kessie, E Counselor, Council& Trade Negotiations Committee, World Trade Organisation ‘WTO Rules Relating 
to Regional Trade Agreement,’ power point presentation for Trade Policy Issues Workshop, Asian Development 
Bank, Singapore, Malaysia 25 February 2002:43. 
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liberalisation must occur before a RTA member satisfies the substantially all trade test. The 
WTO’s Committee on Regional Trade Agreement, has indicated that two interpretations of 
‘substantially all trade’ requirement have emerged. One is a quantitative approach while the 
other qualitative. These two approaches both have their weakness and strength. Finally GATT 
provisions are silent on the establishment of development-oriented RTAs between developed and 
developing countries. The proposals for possible change are discussed at a latter stage of this 
thesis. GATS regionalism rules are also weak. As its terminology is close to that of GATT 
Article XXIV, GATS Article V suffers from many of the same problems that plague RTAs 
covering trade in goods. Other shortcomings of the regionalism management rules are discussed 
below. 
4.3. The WTO legal standards for RTAs: Analysis and proposal for change. 
A number of proposals have been presented so far for the review of the WTO provisional 
transparency mechanism252 for regional trade agreements. The US Proposal on the transparency 
mechanism is that all RTAs should be reviewed in a single WTO Committee. 253 This is a 
departure from the current mechanism where the Committee on Regional Trade Agreement 
reviews RTAs falling under Article XXIV of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).254 The Committee on 
Trade and Development reviews RTAs falling under the Enabling Clause.255 It is argued that the 
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 Transparency mechanism hereinafter abbreviated as TM. 
 
253
 See  ‘Review of the RTAs Transparency Mechanism under paragraph 23:Proposal for the consideration of all 
RTAs in a single WTO Committee,’ Negotiating Groups on Rules, World Trade Organization, January 24, 2011, 
TN/RL/W/248 which proposes that all RTAs should be considered by the Committee on Regional Trade Agreement 
(CRTA). 
 
254
  See article 18 of the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of 14 December 2006 
which provides in part that: 
 
‘The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements ("CRTA") and the Committee on Trade and Development ("CTD") 
are instructed to implement this Transparency Mechanism. The CRTA shall do so for RTAs falling under Article 
XXIV of GATT 1994 and Article V of GATS, while the CTD shall do so for RTAs falling under paragraph 2(c) of the 
Enabling Clause.’ 
 
255
 See article 18 of the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of 14 December 2006. 
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US Proposal will solve the problem of ‘dual notifications’ of the Transparency Mechanism.256 
India has opposed this change on the premise that the US proposal goes beyond the mandate of 
the Negotiating Group on Rules as it involves a fundamental change in the operation of the 
mechanism. Egypt, Argentina, China, Bolivia and Brazil have also opposed the US proposal on 
the ground that the role of the Committee on Trade and Development would be undermined if 
the consideration of RTAs between developing countries (the Enabling Clause RTAs) would be 
moved to the Committee on RTAs.The European Union, Turkey, Korea, Japan, Switzerland, 
Colombia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Costa Rica have supported the US 
proposal and its consideration by the Negotiating Group. The US proposal aims at amending 
paragraph 18 of the Transparency Mechanism consolidating the consideration of all RTAs in a 
single committee in order to avoid unresolvable conflicts among the WTO members concerning 
the choice of forum for RTAs transparency mechanism examination. It is suggested that 
paragraph 18 of the TM should be amended to read in full as: 
 ‘18.  The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements ("CRTA") is instructed to implement 
this Transparency Mechanism. [FN 3 retained]’ 
It is important to note however that prior to the establishment of the CRTA, RTAs were 
reviewed in individual working parties or considered briefly in the GATT Council.  Given the 
proliferation of RTAs starting in the 1990's, Members sought a more efficient means by which to 
consider them.  The General Council established the CRTA in 1996  
‘having regard to agreements which are to be notified, as the case may be, under 
Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, Article V of 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services or the 1979 Decision on Differential and 
More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries.’257 
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 Members have had disagreement in the past over the forum in which a number of agreements should be 
considered under the Transparency mechanism. Some have even notified a single agreement under both Article 
XXIV of 1994 and the Enabling Clause for consideration. 
257WT/L/127. 
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Finally it is also argued that the United States proposal to change the TM is aimed at ensuring its 
practical operation.258 The second proposal from Ecuador involves a number of procedural 
adjustments. Ecuador proposes that the communication to the WTO about RTA should take the 
form of joint notes signed by all the parties to that RTA and one of these parties should be 
entrusted to submit the information needed.259 The proposal suggests the insertion of the 
following paragraphs in section D (Other provision) before the current paragraph 20. 
‘a)Communications submitted under paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 14 and 15 shall take the form of 
joint notes signed by all of the Members participating in new negotiations or by all 
Members parties to the RTA in question, as appropriate. 
b) The information needed to assist Members in their consideration of a notified RTA, 
including the information referred to in paragraphs 7(a) and 12 and in the Annex, shall 
be transmitted to the WTO Secretariat through the party entrusted with submitting it on 
behalf of all of the Members parties to the RTA in question. 
c) When the WTO Secretariat holds consultations concerning a notified RTA, including 
the cases referred to in paragraphs 6, 7(b) and 9, it shall approach the party tasked with 
conducting the consultations on behalf of the Members parties to the ACR in question. 
d )When Members parties to an RTA submit successive communications on the same 
subject matter following the procedures established under paragraph (4a), the bodies 
entrusted with the implementation of the Mechanism as well as the WTO Secretariat shall 
act pursuant to the latest of those communications, unless the said Members provide 
otherwise.’ 
 
                                                          
258
 Paragraph 14 of ‘Review of the RTAs Transparency Mechanism under paragraph 23: Proposal for the 
consideration of all RTAs in a single WTO Committee,” Negotiating Groups on Rules, World Trade Organization, 
January 24, 2011, TN/RL/W/248. 
 
259
  See ‘Regional Trade Agreements: Communication from Ecuador, Negotiating Groups on Rules, World Trade 
Organization, January 24, 2011, TN/RL/W/249 and Proposal for procedural Adjustment to the Transparency 
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements (WT/L/671). 
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A number of delegations have welcomed Ecuador’s proposal.260 Chinese Taipei and Korea have 
opposed the “joint notes procedure” on the ground that it could result in delays. The third 
proposal from Bolivia aims at amending the main RTA provision of Article XXIV of GATT to 
include wording on special and differential treatment for developing countries contained in 
Article V of GATS.261 The African group has consistently supported a similar ACP proposal on 
the review of GATT Article XXIV provisions. An AU Conference of Ministers meeting in Addis 
Ababa in March 2009 adopted a declaration on EPAs that, inter alia, ‘call[ed] upon the African 
group in the WTO, in collaboration with other members to intensify efforts towards 
appropriately amending Article XXIV of GATT 1994 with a view to allowing for necessary 
Special and Differential Treatment, less than full reciprocity principle and explicit flexibilities 
that are consistent with asymmetry required to make the EPS’s development oriented.’ The 
African group position is clear; the substantive provisions of GATT Article XXIV presently 
must be changed in such a manner that facilitate the establishment of development-oriented 
RTAs between  developing and developed countries. Such RTAs would allow deep African 
integration into the world trade system.262 To achieve this, two approaches exist within the 
African group. The first approach involves inserting a generic Special and Differential 
Treatment(S&D) provision into GATT Article XXIV.The following provision also mirroring 
GATS Article V: 3(a) is proposed for inclusion in GATT 1994 Article XXIV: 
‘Where developing countries are parties to an agreement with developed countries for 
the formation of a Customs Union, a free trade area, or an interim arrangement leading 
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 The European Union said it offered useful solutions while New Zealand said it offered sensible suggestions. 
  
261
  See ‘Negotiations aimed at Clarifying and Improving Disciplines and Procedures under the Existing 
WTO Provisions applying to Regional Trade Agreements –A Proposal to Clarify  
Developmental Aspects of Regional Trade Agreements,’ Negotiating Groups on Rules, World Trade Organization, 
January 26, 2011, TN/RL/W/250.Special and Differential Treatment (SDT or sometimes just S& D) provides formal 
recognition of the disadvantages developing countries face in the world trading system.   
 
262
 See further The ACP Group of States document on ‘Developmental aspects of regional trade agreements and 
special and differential treatment in WTO rules: GATT 1994 Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause’ 
(TN/RL/W/155) which points at key arguments to support the incorporation of a pro-development clarification and 
improvement of GATT Article XXIV.  It calls for formally and explicitly integrating operational and effective 
S&DT in GATT Article XXIV in order to enhance the development dimension in the wake of the growing 
formation of RTAs between developing and developed countries. 
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to either a customs union or a free trade agreement, Special and differential treatment 
shall be provided to developing countries regarding the conditions set out in GATT 1994 
Article paragraphs 5 to 9 inclusive, in particular subparagraph 5(c ) and subparagraph 
8(a)(i) and (b).” 
The second approach is for the African group states being actively involved in the details of the 
negotiations of flexibility regarding elements such as the substantially all the trade coverage, the 
transition period and the degree of asymmetry in reduction of trade barriers. India, Kenya, China 
and South Africa have supported Bolivia’s Proposal. Bolivia argues that involving developed 
and developing countries, the principle of less-than-full reciprocity and longer implementation 
period should be accorded to developing countries. 
As noted earlier in chapter two of this thesis,  different interpretations of “substantially all the 
trade” as to whether it refers to RTA trade in substantially all product sectors or substantial trade 
in all product sectors combined continues to impede the effective examination of RTAs under the 
WTO. Both Australia and the European Union have taken a great interest on its interpretation 
differently. Australia, for instance has argued that “substantially all the trade” requires RTA 
parties to include all sectors especially agriculture. The EU has in turn, argued that the word 
“substantial” in the phrase “substantially all the trade” does not obligate a country in the RTA 
to liberalize all its trade, a position supported by the WTO case law.263 During the examination 
of the European Economic Community in 1957, its member states proposed that ‘a free-trade 
area should be considered as having been achieved for substantially all the trade when the 
volume of liberalised trade reached 80 percent of the total trade’ (emphasis added).264  
Many other members of the Working Party examining the EEC refused this proposal as they held 
that it was ‘inappropriate to fix a general figure of the percentage of trade ’as a requirement to 
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 The panel in the Turkey-Textile Case concluded that the word “substantial” is clearly not the same as “all". 
 
264
 GATT, Report submitted by the Committee on Treaty of Rome to the Contracting Parties, on 29th November 
1957, Annex IV 30 L 778/(Nov. 29 1957).The Report of the Sub-group of the Committee on the “European Economic 
Community” which examined the consistency with Article XXIV of the EEC Treaty provisions for the association of 
overseas territories notes that the EEC member States proposed the following definition of the term ‘substantially 
all”:“a free-trade area should be considered as having been achieved for substantially all the trade when the volume of 
liberalized trade reached 80 per cent of total trade’. 
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meet the ‘substantially all trade ’ criterion.265 The Report of the Working Party on “European 
Communities - Agreements with Portugal” notes the view of the EEC ‘that no exact definition of 
the phrase [‘substantially all the trade’] existed and that the precise figures would vary from case 
to case according to several factors.  At any rate, percentages were established as a general 
indicator of the trade covered by the Agreement and were not to be regarded as a conclusive 
factor’.266 The Report of the Working Party on the “European Free Trade Area - Examination of 
the Stockholm Convention” on the other hand notes that: 
‘[t]he phrase ‘substantially all the trade’ had a qualitative as well as quantitative aspect 
and that it should not be taken as allowing the exclusion of a major sector of economic 
activity.  For this reason, the percentage of trade covered, even if it were established to be 
90 per cent, was not considered to be the only factor to be taken into account.’267  
An attempt at the interpretation of the phrase was captured by the preamble to the Understanding 
on the interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
which ‘recogni [sed] that the expansion of world trade is increased if the elimination between the 
constituent territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all trade, 
and diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded.’ The most elaborate proposal on the 
interpretation of the “substantially all trade” criterion was formulated by Australia in 
2005.Australia proposes to define the ‘substantially all trade’ criterion in terms of the tariff lines 
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 Many members of the Sub-Group said that each case of a proposed customs union or free-trade area had to be 
considered on its merits and that it was, therefore, inappropriate to fix a general figure of the percentage of trade which 
could be subjected to internal barriers without running counter to the definition in paragraph 8(b) of Article XXIV.  A 
matter to be considered was whether the provisions of a free-trade area pointed towards a gradual increase of barriers 
affecting the trade between the constituent parties or a gradual reduction of such barriers.  Moreover, any calculation of 
the percentage of trade not freed from barriers would need to take account of the fact that this would be, or would have 
been, larger if the trade had been allowed to flow freely.  Some members of the Sub-Group thought that it would be 
unrealistic to apply the same criterion to a free-trade area such as that existing between Nicaragua and El Salvador and 
to a free-trade area the members of which were highly industrialized countries accounting for a large percentage of 
world trade. 
 
266
 L/3901, adopted on 19 October 1973, 20s/171, 176, para. 16. 
 
267
 The member States agreed that the quantitative aspect, in other words the percentage of trade freed, was not the only 
consideration to be taken into account.  Insofar as it was relevant to consider the qualitative as well as the quantitative 
aspect, it would be appropriate to look at the consistency of the Convention with Article XXIV:8(b) from a broader 
point of view and to take account of the fact that the agricultural agreements did facilitate the expansion of trade in 
agricultural products even though some of the provisions did not require the elimination of the barriers to trade.  
Moreover, insofar as both qualitative and quantitative aspects were concerned it was incorrect to say that the 
agricultural sector was excluded from the free-trade area; in fact barriers would be removed on one third of total trade 
in agricultural products between member States.( L/1235, adopted on 4 June 1960, 9S/70, 83-85, paras. 48-49). 
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listed in the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS).According to 
Australia, an RTA would-upon its entry into force –need to eliminate duties and other 
restrictions to trade on at least seventy percent of tariff lines at the HS Six-digit level.268 
Discussions on this proposal are underway under the Negotiating Group of Rules and possibly a 
consensus will be reached soon.  
4.4. Conclusion and Recommendations. 
 Regional trade agreements are here to stay and the following conclusions and recommendations 
are therefore necessary: 
a) Although scholars like Bhagwati and Panagariya are of the view that regionalism and 
multilateralism are conflictual, the discussions captured in this thesis support the view 
that regionalism and multilateralism are complimentary. 
b) Both the revision of the WTO rules to remove the ambiguity and reinterpretation of the 
controversial phrases taking into account political, legal, institutional and economic 
factors are necessary for a more concrete and viable management of RTAs in the 
multilateral trading system. 
c) There is a strong case for re-examining GATT 1994 Article XXIV and GATS Article V 
to strengthen the rules on RTA management. 
d) It is clear that an effective WTO monitoring process of RTAs requires a consensus on the 
interpretation of the term ‘substantially all trade’. 
e) The interpretation of the substantially all requirement should encompass both qualitative 
and quantitative aspects which satisfy the member states political, legal and economic 
factors and agenda.  
f) The multilateral rules on regional trade management are weak and ambiguous and thus 
the change to strengthen the rules is necessary to ensure effective examination and 
supervision of regional trade agreement formation in the world trade. The review 
proposals discussed could form the basis for this change in the RTAs rules. 
g) The discussions on the East Africa Community so far shows the continued growth of 
intra-EAC trade in spite of some trade imbalances which emanates from the inherited 
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 See generally, Negotiating Group on Rules, Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by Australia, TN/RL 
/W/173/Rev. 1(March 3,2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
historical economic structures of the partner states. The EAC has registered increased 
trade amongst the Partner States signifying a positive effect of the EAC Customs Union. 
Associated with this, the Partner States have been reporting increased revenues, and 
investment flows.269 
 
Regionalism and multilateralism are complimentary as shown in the case study of the East 
African Community. The current regional trade agreement management rules are weak and 
ambiguous and possible amendments and reinterpretation of these rules is therefore necessary for 
enabling regionalism and multilaterism work together better. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
269East African Community Secretariat. The East African Community Trade Report 2008.East African Community. 
(2010). 
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